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Abstract
This thesis explores the Boston Police Strike of 1919 through the lens of class
struggle and ethnic tension. Through an examination of the development of Boston’s
class structure, particularly focused on the upper class Brahmins and the Irish
working class, it concludes that the Brahmins’ success in suppressing the police strike
allowed for their maintenance of socioeconomic power within the city despite their
relatively small population. Based on their extreme class cohesion resulting from the
growing prominence of Harvard University as well as the Brahmins’ unabashed
discrimination against their ethnic neighbors in almost every sphere of society, the
Brahmins were able to maintain their power in Boston’s cultural world. The Irish
working class, on the other hand, which attempted to use the increasing popularity of
public and police unionization to challenge the status and power of the Brahmins
through the creation of the Boston Police Union and subsequently through the
notorious Boston Police Strike of 1919 was ultimately unsuccessful, and it was left in
the same position in which it started, at the bottom of the social ladder. The
suppression of the strike by members of the upper class and their allies, particularly
those in high government positions, served to preserve and affirm the socioeconomic
power of the Brahmins over much of Boston society and brought the era of public
police unionization to a close.

1
Introduction
Boston has long been understood as a city rife with ethnic turmoil and cultural
clashes, particularly between the traditional Boston upper class and the immigrant Irish
working class. This thesis seeks to explore this topic through the lens of the Boston
Police Strike of 1919, in which a segment of the Irish working class, through its
connections to the Boston Police Department and through police unionization in general,
attempted to challenge Boston’s traditional, upper class dominated society. Through the
suppression of the strike, the Brahmins successfully thwarted the attempt by this segment
of the Irish working class to redistribute social power in a more equitable way, asserting
and maintaining the dominance of their own cohesive group despite their comparatively
small population.
This thesis examines the Boston Police Strike of 1919 as an essential event in
Boston’s history because of its role in the reinforcement of the city’s elitist, traditional
social structure. Beginning with a history of the development of the Brahmin upper class
from the city’s founding and a narrative of the Irish working class experience through
much of the nineteenth century, this thesis will eventually conclude that the strike was an
unsuccessful attempt by the Irish working class to manipulate the traditional
socioeconomic organization of Boston in order to strip the Brahmins of their
disproportionate social power within the city. Though the Irish community, arriving in
Boston beginning in the 1830s, had come to be a majority of the city’s population by the
turn of the twentieth century, the upper class elite still maintained control over culture,
government, and socioeconomic life. The premeditated walkout of the majority of the
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Boston Police Department employees on September 8, 1919, sparked by the city’s refusal
to legalize the creation of the Boston Police Union and its subsequent affiliation with the
American Federation of Labor, launched the city into a state of chaos and forced people
to question the role of class and ethnicity in their city’s traditional social hierarchy.
Through its suppression of police unionization and public sector strikes, the city’s upper
class was able to preserve its position of socioeconomic and cultural dominance over
Boston’s Irish working class for much of the twentieth century.
Though I make the point that the Boston Police Strike was a vehicle used by a
segment of the Irish working class to catalyze the class struggle and increasing ethnic
tension within the city, I ultimately argue that the story of the strike is one of upper class
success. The labor movement and wave of public sector unionization sweeping the nation
during the beginning of the twentieth century was utilized by the Irish working class as a
convenient way to gain not only better working conditions but also as a way of asserting
their rights as a social and ethnic group, using the labor movement to gain much more
than mere economic equality; yet, the Brahmins brutally suppressed this action in order to
maintain their position of superiority over their ethnic working class neighbors. Just as
Irish mine workers in Butte, Montana capitalized on the ethnic homogeneity of the
workforce to unify in their fight for better working conditions, the Brahmins, as a
uniquely homogenous and cohesive community, came together through their connections
to and opinions on the Boston Police Department in order to fight those attempting to
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challenge the status quo and the traditional organization of the city.1 The strike was the
culmination of a century-long fight about justice, dignity, and class and ethnic
organization within Boston between these two groups, and the elite upper class
eventually came out on top of this struggle, asserting their dominance once again.
This angle of investigation will provide a new understanding of the 1919 Boston
Police Strike focused on class and ethnicity, specifically the native-born, Protestant upper
class, rather than on labor and unionization. As most previous studies of the strike
understand it solely as a key event in the national labor movement and the development
of the American law enforcement industry, this type of exploration is essential to
understanding the larger implications of the strike within its contemporary social context.
While class and ethnicity, mostly that of the striking policemen, have been considered by
other historians as minor factors contributing to the 1919 events in Boston, they have
never been viewed as the underlying, most essential causes of the strike itself nor as
influential in the strike’s outcome. While I cannot ignore the obvious importance of
material grievances as contributing factors to the strike’s occurrence, it is not the material
aspect of the strike upon which this study is truly focused.
The story of Boston during this era is a complicated one, namely because class
cohesion and ethnic group formation resulted from prejudices, the perpetuation of
stereotypes, and ultimately the upper class’s disproportionate access to power and media
outlets as methods of spreading ideas. E.P. Thompson’s understanding of class is
essential to the understanding Boston’s social structure during the beginning of the
1

David M. Emmons, “Immigrant Workers and Industrial Hazards: The Irish Miners of
Butte, 1880-1919,” Journal of American Ethnic History 5 no.1 (Fall 1985): 53-54.

4
twentieth century because of his argument that, “The working class did not rise like the
sun at an appointed time.” Class is not something that has a given definition; rather, it
evolves from cultural interactions within a given society, not the experience of a single,
isolated group at a given point in history. Class is a product of human relationships and
common experiences that connect people across geographic and ethnic boundaries.
Without group interaction, class identity could not exist for a lack of defining and
distinguishing characteristics. Groups need to interact with others in order to cultivate a
sense of self as distinct from one another. As many of the Brahmin reactions to police
unionization and the 1919 police strike were unquestionably colored by anti-Irish beliefs
and prejudices, it is important to understand how these ideas were developed and
promulgated throughout much of the city’s history in reaction to the influx of and
interactions with the rapidly growing Irish immigrant population.
Additionally, an understanding of class can only be gained through a study of
groups over time. Class identity changes and evolves as groups and societies develop and
relationships among them change; this is particularly important in the United States
where steady waves of immigrants began arriving in the 1830s and continually disturbed
the status quo, interacting with social and ethnic groups already established within the
city. It would be impossible to understand social class without understanding the
relationships that have arisen in a given society or the importance that shared economic
experiences have in bringing groups together.2 In Boston, the Brahmin elite and the Irish
immigrant working class ultimately developed the strong class ties and class identities
2

E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books,
1966), 9.
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which were so essential to the events during the twentieth century through their constant
interaction, contact, and conflict.
Similarly, the formation of the ethnic identity of the Brahmins as well as the
working class Irish community can only be understood with a similar definition of
ethnicity, based on evolution and group relationships. Kathleen Conzen and David
Gerber offer this, arguing that ethnicity, like class, is a human construct rather than a
natural and immutable fact. Though grounded in real experiences and cultural attributes,
ethnicity was created and amplified through relationships between and among groups. It
is only through a clash of cultural and historical memories that ethnicity can arise;
contrasts between groups are necessary to highlight those similarities within a group that
bring people together. Just as class cohesion in Boston came about as a result of the
perpetuation of stereotypes and prejudices against other groups, the ethnic identities of
the native-born, protestant Bostonians were enhanced if not created as a result of their
interaction with non-Brahmin Bostonians, particularly the Irish working class
community. Indeed, interactions between groups are an essential component of ethnic
group and identity formation. Ethnicity is not static. It evolves over time, adapting to fit
the contemporary social context and experience. An understanding of ethnicity in one
time and place will be unavoidably different than an understanding of the same concept
in a different location and era. Ethnicity can neither be understood nor develop in
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vacuum. Instead, it must be understood through the study of group interactions and
relationships.3
The views of Thompson, Conzen and Gerber are essential to the study of Boston’s
various socioeconomic groups in the immediate post-World War I era. It is only with the
consideration of these views of ethnicity and class that we can begin to unravel the
complicated history of the Brahmins and the Irish, and especially their inextricable
involvement with the Boston Police Department, because their relationships with law
enforcement and the other Boston groups developed through social interaction and ethnic
divisions, two social categories which were often inseparable from one another.
The first chapter of this thesis focuses on class formation, Irish immigration to
Boston throughout the nineteenth century, and the cultivation of a cohesive upper class in
the city. Without this background, it would be impossible to understand the events of
1919, as they are the result of a century of socioeconomic evolution and changing
municipal circumstances. The second chapter details the development of the Boston
Police Department and the evolution of American police work with a particular focus on
the experiences of Boston’s Irish police officers, their unfortunate socioeconomic
position, and their interactions with the Brahmin upper class leadership and community,
complementing the information presented in the first chapter. At the conclusion of the
second chapter, the reader will have a full picture of the situation and sentiments of the
wealthy elite and the Irish working class, especially those employed by the police
department, in Boston at the close of the First World War. The third and final chapter
3

Kathleen Neils Conzen and David A. Gerber, “The invention of ethnicity: A perspective
from the U.S.A.,” Journal of American Ethnic History 12 no.1 (Fall 1992): 3.
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features an exploration of the 1919 Boston Police Strike and the weeks immediately
following. It details upper class Boston’s aggressive reaction to the unionization of the
police and to public sector strikes, providing a unique perspective on the importance of
ethnicity and social class to the strike itself, and detailing their unsurprising suppression
of the police union’s actions. It ultimately explores the nature of the Brahmins’ success in
asserting their socioeconomic power during a time of explicit challenge to that power,
and it illustrates the extreme elitism that the upper class exerted as a method of
obstructing, and eventually bringing to an enduring close, the actions of the Boston
Police Union.
While the Boston Police Strike has been the subject of previous historic studies,
this type of examination has never before been undertaken. There are few, if any, primary
sources detailing the ideas and opinions of the police workers and other members of
Boston’s Irish working class during this era. Yet, a study of the Boston Police Strike from
the perspective of the upper class, considering information surrounding the social status
and economic circumstance of the Brahmins as well as their firsthand responses and
reactions to the strike, can offer a unique understanding of the strike and its effect on
class formation and social organization, even with respect to the Irish community.
Though seemingly a fight for materialistic gains by the Irish working class, the Boston
Police Strike of 1919 was a symbolic struggle for socioeconomic rights and societal
fairness that was quelled by the upper class as an affirmation of Brahmin power. With
new insight into the social and ethnic history of the city, modern historians and

8
researchers of all kinds will be able to further their understanding of Boston’s role in the
development of modern America and Boston’s current socioeconomic situation.

9
Chapter 1: Social Class Formation within the Irish and Brahmin Communities
Boston’s class formation took on a different form than that of other American
cities as a result of the tension between the upper class Brahmins and the working class
Irish community. The social situation at the outbreak of World War I directly resulted
from a long history of class struggle and identity formation beginning with the arrival of
Irish immigrants to Boston during the beginning of the nineteenth century, and this
alteration in the city’s population forced other prominent groups within it to reconsider
their role in the city’s social and economic life.
When British settlers first founded Boston over in the early seventeenth century
the population was small and homogenous, but as time passed the homogenous
population adapted in order to incorporate arriving immigrant populations and the
increasing economic divisions arising as a result of industrialization, or lack thereof. The
Irish community arriving in the 1830s upset the status quo by challenging the economic
and social balance of the city. At the same time, Harvard University began gaining power
and prestige; this allowed the upper class Boston population to utilize its connections to
the world of academia to further solidify class identity and cohesively unify itself in
opposition to the growing ethnic working class. The upper class Brahmins felt as if they
were part of an exclusive society of both wealth and knowledge. Their interactions with
others were always colored by this particular worldview, especially their interactions with
the Irish working class population. It would be impossible to understand the events of the
twentieth century without an understanding of the development of class and ethnic
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tension in Boston, particularly that of the Irish immigrant community and the wealthy
Brahmin elite.
By the beginning of the First World War, the Boston of the upper class Brahmins
was quite distinct from that of the Irish working class. Though both communities seemed
to tolerate each other with relatively few public clashes throughout the city’s history,
tensions between the Yankees and the Irish escalated between 1910 and 1923.
As noted by Brahmin-bred author Cleveland Amory, “The Proper Bostonian did
not just happen; he was planned.”4 The elite upper class of Boston developed its own
unique culture during the nineteenth century, and this culture of exclusivity came to
distinguish the Brahmin class from all others below them on the city’s social hierarchy
for the following century. Besides a deep belief in order and moderation, the main focus
of this society was on propriety.5 Their collective identity was, and still is in the present
day, based on family networks accompanied by wealth. Functioning similar to any
European aristocracy, membership in the Brahmin class was gained simply by an
accident of birth into one of Boston’s prominent families. Name and lineage meant
everything, as long as it was accompanied by superiority in both the social and
intellectual spheres. The Brahmins believed that they were inherently superior to not only
other Bostonians but also those hailing from other places in the country. Due to this
Brahmin sense of entitlement, Amory also noted, “Woe to the stranger who gets off at the

4

Cleveland Amory, The Proper Bostonians, (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc.,
1947),12.
5
Frederic Cople Jaher, The Urban Establishment: Upper Strata in Boston, New York,
Charleston, Chicago, and Los Angeles (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 81.
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Back Bay Station, or even one who proceeds to the South Station or the Park Street
subway exit, without the feeling that he has come to a shrine.”6
Before the arrival of the first wave of Irish immigration, in fact during the entirety
of the 17th and 18th centuries, Boston’s population proved mostly uniform, both ethnically
and economically. Officially founded in 1630, Boston quickly grew as a center of
business and trade; the city’s founders were mostly upper-class merchant adventurers,
and the general population followed suit.7 As time passed, however, the city’s
opportunities for both crafty entrepreneurs and those seeking employment never
substantially increased. Boston’s importance as an industrial hub steadily declined with
the growth of other coastal cities, particularly New York City, as well as with the
development of new transportation technology at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
namely the railroad. Massachusetts chartered its first railroad in 1831, and it opened to
traffic in 1835. This further decreased Boston’s significance as a hub of trade, as the
railroads diminished the importance of accessible waterways. When people could easily
move and transport goods outside of the city both locally and elsewhere in the country,
they began to view Boston as a waypoint, rather than as a final destination.8
Boston offered few advantages for entrepreneurs, further increasing the
homogeneity of the city’s population during this early era by attracting relatively few
newcomers as either employers or laborers. Entrepreneurs hesitated to undertake new

6

Amory, The Proper Bostonians, 25.
Ibid., 36.
8
Oscar Handlin, Boston’s Immigrants: A Study in Acculturation (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press, 1959), 7.
7
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ventures in Boston due to the lack of cheap, available labor.9 As industry boomed in other
Massachusetts cities, Boston had a difficult time matching their success. As a result of the
lack of innovation and industrial development in the city proper, few workers
successfully found employment in Boston. Not surprisingly, workers shied away from the
city in favor of places with an abundance of job openings. Immigrant workers particularly
looked to towns developing as hubs of the textile industry, which had been positively
affected by the industrial revolution; they merely passed through Boston, seeing it solely
as their point of entry into the country and not as a final stop on their pursuit of the
‘American Dream.’ By 1845, Boston was still a “town of small traders, of petty artisans
and handicraftsmen, and of great merchant princes,”10 and the rest of the country was
rapidly advancing beyond Boston, both economically and technologically. This changed
very little over the following decades, resulting in a lack of development and lack of
economic progress in Boston in comparison to other American cities. By the time
immigrants began to arrive en masse, they entered into a uniquely unvaried community
with little diversity.
The existence of Boston’s twentieth century upper class can be attributed to the
few merchants the city was able to attract, mainly those prospering at the very beginning
of the 19th century. Though the wealthy elite of Boston, the city’s “First Families,” prefer
to believe that they are descended from the original settlers of the city, their true origins
lie with the emerging middle-class of the early 1800s composed of merchant princes who
saw enormous amounts of success during this era. The original families settled in Boston
9

Ibid., 11.
Ibid., 11.
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were unable to establish themselves as an economic elite lasting more than one
generation because they squandered their fortunes, living as well as possible without
saving a penny. These families often found themselves without any substantial amount of
wealth to pass on to future generations. Because the fortunes and social standing of the
first Boston families died out with the original generation, the Brahmin elite of the early
twentieth century had few connections to this initial community; instead, they belonged,
and could trace their fortunes, to a class of mercantile elite who acquired considerable
wealth by saving money and creating trusts, rising to power during this time. The actual
founders of elite Boston are those who were wealthy enough, and forward thinking
enough, to pass on an inheritance to their children and grandchildren, creating a class of
people whose social status was initially based on the accumulation of money through
entrepreneurial ventures and commerce.11 Later, wealth became just one of many factors
contributing to the establishment and maintenance of social status in Boston.
The rise of Boston’s merchant princes sparked the rise of a new upper class, and
the growing prestige of Harvard University helped to foster a cohesive class identity
among this emerging group. Eventually, Harvard helped to cultivate a unique class
culture inextricable from the Brahmin world of economic and academic superiority.
Because the Boston Brahmins viewed themselves as a class of not just the economically
elite but also the culturally elite, they capitalized on the nearby location of the most
prestigious academic institution in the country. Though some argue that Harvard was,
from the beginning, meant to mirror Boston society, in actuality the development of the
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Amory, The Proper Bostonians, 40.
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Harvard University community was an essential factor underlying the creation of this
unique social class.12
As the city’s population became increasingly more diverse, the Harvard
community moved in the opposite direction, becoming increasingly more homogenous,
allowing the upper class Boston community to further cohere through their ties to the
institution. As Harvard began to gain extensive wealth, primarily from private donors
living within the Boston city limits, the composition of the student body began to change
to reflect the increased economic status of the institution.13 According to historian Ronald
Story, the university gained more students from Boston proper, drawing fewer students
from rural New England and more students from Boston’s fashionable families. This
helped to unify the Boston elite community geographically as well as culturally, as
Harvard students came primarily from wealthy families within the same limited social
circles. The Brahmin elite began to exclusively send their children to Harvard beginning
in the first half of the 19th century. “It was from about 1820 to 1850 that Harvard came
literally to be an extended Brahmin family, and Boston “society” a “leech” on the
students.”14
Harvard played an essential role in reinforcing and perpetuating the sense of
superiority and exclusivity expressed by the Brahmin community. Not only did Brahmins
have an “unusually high regard” for the University and its community, Harvard became a
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Amory, The Proper Bostonians, 294.
Ronald Story, “Harvard and the Boston Brahmins: A Study in Institutional and Class
Development, 1800-1865,” Journal of Social History 8 no.3 (Spring 1975): 98-99.
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large part of the elite Bostonian’s adult life and identity.15 The high reputation of the
university fit perfectly into the Brahmin understanding of a world based on status and
prestige. Rising costs and classical admissions examinations, two factors that made
admission all but impossible for those who were not members of the city’s elite class,
forced Harvard to become an exclusionary tool of the elite and reinforced Boston’s
emerging social class system. In fact, the rise of Harvard helped to create and bolster a
more cohesive Brahmin class as a result of the increasing homogeneity of the student
body.16 A Harvard education taught people upper class values while simultaneously
distancing and distinguishing these people from the middle and lower classes, namely
those without the same educational and cultural opportunities available to them,
especially due to the inherently discriminatory admissions system encouraging
connections to others with a similar upbringing.17 Though for some Harvard could offer a
passage to the upper class, as those lacking lineage could occasionally use a Harvard
degree to alter their social standing, this was relatively uncommon. “Harvard thus became
an important stage of socialization, and graduation, a rite of passage and a credential for
recruitment in upper-class Boston.”18 By furthering the development of an exclusively
elite class of Bostonians, Harvard simultaneously reinforced the position and
cohesiveness of immigrant and working class communities in the larger social
organization of Boston during this era.

15

Amory, The Proper Bostonians, 292.
Story, “Harvard and the Boston Brahmins,” 109.
17
Ibid., 111.
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At the same time that Harvard and the Brahmins began to cohere and distinguish
themselves within the Boston community, Irish immigrants flooded into the socially
homogenous city in order to escape the devastation and poverty in their native land
caused by the Irish Potato Famine, and they found themselves settling within Boston out
of financial necessity. Unlike most other immigrants, who quickly fled Boston upon
arrival due to the lack of economic opportunities and the promise of success in other
locales, the famine Irish were forced to stay as a result of their inability to afford travel
beyond their port of entry. They were also financially unable to live outside of Boston’s
city limits, particularly in the rapidly developing suburbs as did other groups, due to tolls
and fares required to enter and exit the water-locked city.19 Boston’s first electric
streetcar line, in fact the first of its kind in the country, began operating in 1889 and
allowed easier transportation for commuters living outside the city, yet this
simultaneously limited the Irish community’s ability to leave the city limits due to their
inability to pay streetcar fares.20 The Irish working class was thus confined not only to the
greater Boston area but also within the city limits. The only people that stayed in Boston
were those who were much more concerned with escaping Europe than in seeking a
fortune in America, and the Irish, alone among the variety of immigrant communities
increasingly populating America’s cities, fit into this category. By 1855, there were
already more than 50,000 Irish immigrants living in Boston, and they soon grew to

19

Handlin, Boston’s Immigrants, 91.
“History: Electrification,” About the MBTA,
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become the city’s most prosperous ethnic community, clustering together in the most
congested sections of the city.21
As a result of the economic history of the Irish upon their arrival in Boston, the
immigrant Irish working class had an unusually difficult time coming up with the money
to buy all of the necessities of life and found themselves in a continual state of poverty,
particularly in opposition to the successful Boston elite community. Just as Karl Marx, in
his discussion of primitive accumulation, recognized the problems associated with the
historical process of separating the producer from the means of production, the Irish had
trouble adapting to the lifestyle of the American wage-worker. Almost exactly following
the argument presented by Marx in Capital, many famine immigrants had been farmers,
and were therefore not used to having to pay for food and other means of subsistence
upon their arrival in Boston and conversion into wage-laborers.22 Similarly, labor
historian Herbert Gutman discusses the necessary industrialization of entire cultures
including preindustrial white immigrants in the era following 1815, and the Irish
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Handlin, Boston’s Immigrants, 52-53, 109.
Ibid., 86. In Chapter 26 of Capital, Karl Marx defines ‘primitive accumulation’ as the
historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. The transition
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enter into the exchange process; yet, as a wage-worker, he must sell his labor power in
exchange for wages so that the means of subsistence may be purchased. Throughout the
process of primitive accumulation, it is necessary for a person to make the mental
transition from self-employed agricultural worker to industrial wage-laborer.
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immigrants to the United States needed to adjust to life in a developing industrial society
from their primarily agricultural lifestyle.23
In order to support themselves, most Irish immigrants turned to, or were funneled
into, unskilled day labor as a mere means of scraping by. This type of work, however, did
not provide enough to even maintain a family of four. Irish women and children often had
to work to supplement a family’s earnings, mainly taking jobs as servants in Boston’s
middle-class homes. Though initially Irish immigrants held the same jobs as other racial
and ethnic groups, the occupations into which Irish workers later were channeled
generally employed few other minority workers, helping to cohere the community
through work while simultaneously creating an Irish sphere of employment in which they
alone dominated a variety of industries.24 This isolated them from other workers and
carved a niche in which the city, namely the Brahmin elite, completely relied on the Irish
community.
The Irish were also disadvantaged in comparison to other immigrant groups in
jobs where community interaction was essential, because other ethnic immigrant groups,
particularly the Italians, turned to shop and business owners who spoke their native
language. Thus, speaking English as a native tongue, though seemingly an advantage in
English-speaking America, did little to help the Irish immigrant community in terms of
employment or inter-ethnic community interaction.25
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As a result of their constant situation of tenuous employment and inability to
support their families, Irish workers looked for industries in which, despite low salaries,
they would be able to receive a steady wage. Some turned to the care of horses or waiting
tables, but many Irish workers found that municipal work offered the type of job security
they sought. Because many sought financial security above all else, they continuously
chose municipal and government jobs, though considered to be a “financial dead-end,”
over more risky ventures. Not only did this employment trend widen the gap between the
existing Brahmin upper class and the Irish working class, it emphasized the distinctions
between the Irish and other immigrant communities in Boston. The few famine Irish that
had been successful in rising economically had done so slowly and minimally.26 Other
immigrant groups arriving at the end of the nineteenth century, particularly Southern and
Eastern Europeans, rapidly passed the Irish on the economic hierarchy because of their
willingness to take business risks for the promise of high rewards. According to historian
Dennis Ryan, financial security was a far lesser concern to groups like Italians and Jews
than for the Irish, so these groups were more easily steered away from, and less likely to
seek out, the dead-end municipal jobs the Irish were more inclined to take.27
The Irish community’s social situation was marked by its interactions with other
Boston communities, native and not. “The concern with status created by the presence of
the Irish immigrants and their offspring affected every group in the city. No man now
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could think of his place in society simply in terms of occupation or income level. It was
necessary also ever to consider ethnic affiliation.”28 Despite their low income level and
generally low economic status, the Irish held a unique position culturally; they were
markedly below the Brahmin class despite their relative similarities, namely race and
native language, to upper class Bostonians in comparison to other ethnic groups.
The Brahmins, fairly established as a cohesive group by the late nineteenth
century, had no trouble keeping the Irish working class out of elite Boston social circles.
Native-born Bostonians discriminated against the Irish solely based on their ethnicity.
The Yankee elite blocked the Boston Irish from entering “important corridors of social
and economic power” like financial institutions, Back Bay clubs, and corporate law firms
and the Boston Bar Association.29 Irish business owners often needed to gain approval of
Brahmins in order to obtain credit for their ventures from Brahmin-owned companies;
simply because entrepreneurs were Irish, these agents often advised the companies to
deny them aid.30 Elite social clubs like the Algonquin and the Somerset refused
membership to the Irish, only increasing their interest in and affiliation with Irish-only
groups.31 The Irish earned a reputation of criminality from the way in which the police
responded to them when Irishmen were found intoxicated wandering on the streets. The
Irish were often charged with minor offenses or misdemeanors for acts committed while
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drunk, while others would have merely been given a ‘tolerant reprimand’ for the same
crime.32
In contrast to the connections among Brahmins resulting from their
socioeconomic circumstances in the United States, the solidarity and feelings of otherness
of the Irish immigrant community in Boston resulted from the strong sense of identity
based on interaction with other groups back in Europe, particularly the cultural conflict
between the Irish and the English.33 Those who considered England to be their mother
country felt as if the Irish, no matter their current country of residence, were culturally
isolated from the intellectual influences of large European cities like London and Paris,
and native Bostonians were no exception to this, likewise holding this belief.34 Upper
class social activities were inseparable from their cultural activities, and the Brahmins
saw the knowledge of culture and the arts as essential to their overall identity.35 Brahmins
generally considered the Irish to be uneducated and uncultured, and treated them with
disdain and discrimination.
Likewise, and consistent with the discrimination imposed on the Irish by Boston’s
elite families, Harvard University openly and unabashedly discriminated against the Irish
community. Henry Cabot Lodge claimed that the Irish were an “undesirable addition to
the young republic,” and the Harvard Lampoon continuously printed comics depicting
and reinforcing negative stereotypes about the Irish community.36 Though students with
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degrees from Boston College were eventually admitted after 1909, the Harvard Law
School originally refused to admit Boston College graduates, as the community
constantly feared that “Harvard-trained Irish lawyers…could alter the commercial and
financial world of Yankee Boston.”37
Though there were technically educational opportunities available for members of
the Irish community, these institutions were still inaccessible to many working class Irish
Bostonians. The College of the Holy Cross, founded in 1843, and Boston College,
established in 1863, were created solely to take in the educated Catholics excluded by the
Harvard community; however, both institutions still charged fees and were unaffordable
by those for whom the colleges were founded. All private education, even below the postsecondary level, was too expensive to be afforded by the Boston Irish, and resulted in the
lack of school attendance of most Irish children.38 Even beyond the world of higher
education, the Irish were met with educational discrimination through the city’s public
school system. In fact, many of the New England private schools were created for the
sole purpose of “secluding proper Bostonians from the urban multitudes,” so that Irish
and Brahmin children would never have to interact in an academic setting.39
Though most children of the wealthy Brahmin class attended elite ivy-league
feeder schools, what Amory labels “socially correct Eastern private schools,” public
school instruction still fell mostly under the control of the Brahmins particularly through
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the course materials.40 In Americans in Process: A South End Settlement House Story,
jointly written in 1903 by employees of the South End House, Robert Woods observed
that the Irish in certain districts “do not represent the best qualities of their race,” and
“have joined the ranks of the permanently poor” due to their non-enterprising
personalities.41 Public schools, through the personal views of teachers and the use of
biased classroom materials, encouraged and perpetuated these and other ethnic
stereotypes. Textbooks depicted those hailing from predominantly Catholic countries as
ignorant and indolent, and specifically labeled the Irish as easily offended and prone to
resentment despite their generosity and innate sense of hospitality. In contrast, those with
origins in the Protestant countries, particularly England, Germany and Holland, were
praised for their intelligence, ingenuity, and industriousness.42
Ethnic prejudice by the upper class consistently targeted the Irish of Boston
throughout this era despite their rapidly growing population. Even though the Irish made
up a majority of public school students by the 1880s, many parents still chose to send
their children to private Catholic schools in order to avoid the Protestant and Brahmin
indoctrination they felt their children experienced through participation in public
education. However, this did little to protect Irish schoolchildren from ethnic stereotypes
and discrimination. By constantly reminding students of the “Yankee stereotypes against
them” and the mere fact of private education, private Catholic schools only helped to
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perpetuate the social inferiority of the Boston Irish community.43 As a result, few among
this community were educated and literate; the Irish working class alone diverged from
the norm of participation in Boston’s uniquely prevalent intellectual life and
community.44
Additionally, unlike Brahmins, Irish parents placed little emphasis on extended,
formal education, especially because of their reliance on any extra income that could be
generated by their children engaging in wage work. This emphasis on work over
education often acted as a brake to the social and economic aspirations of their children.45
Over 1,000 cases of truancy and vagrancy among Irish immigrant children were reported
at the end of the 19th century.46 Thus, it is no surprise that the Boston elite were able to
distinguish and elevate themselves based on the claim of Harvard attendance and
assumed educational superiority.
Even though by 1900 the Irish were undoubtedly the most populous ethnic group
in Boston and that Irish-Catholicism was one of the two most dominant ethno-religious
groups, the fact that the Irish were Catholic immediately identified them as outsiders in
the Boston community because of the upper class emphasized their strong ties to AngloProtestantism, distinguishing them from their ethnic immigrant neighbors.47 As a result,
Catholicism, or rather anti-Catholicism, was the greatest impediment to the assimilation
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of the Irish community into mainstream American culture and society.48 Catholicism
hindered their participation in public educational institutions in an integrated fashion, as
Irish parents preferred to send their children to private schools preaching Catholic values.
Though they wished to be a part of the greater Boston community, many felt that the
public school system taught their children in a biased, nontraditional way, and thus
perpetuated their isolation by refusing to participate in the public educational system.
The Brahmins used their religious background as yet another way to distinguish
themselves from the working-class newcomers; as Oscar Handlin observed, “In a country
that favored whites over blacks, the Boston Irish found themselves in a community that
preferred Negroes to Catholic Immigrants,” showing that Catholics fell below all others
on the Boston social ladder.49 This is especially notable, given the population of both
groups; in a county with a total population of 731,388 people, only 13,886 were reported
to be black while 160,865 people were born in Ireland or claimed 2 Irish parents.50 When
Catholicism combined with a socially unacceptable ethnic heritage, it was deadly to one’s
social aspirations; therefore, Irish-Catholics were stuck at the bottom of the social
hierarchy. Since the Brahmins used religion as a uniting factor, the Irish too turned to
religion as a method of combating the classism and racism they experienced at the hands
of the Anglo-protestant elite.
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While most Irish immigrants were already ethnically Catholic, many turned more
devoutly to religion upon their arrival in Boston, fostering a stronger sense of connection
to the Irish Catholic community. Though adherence to the Irish version of Catholicism
often furthered the isolation of the Irish community from other primarily Catholic
immigrant groups, the Irish as an ethnically Catholic community came to dominate the
Boston Church in such a way that newer Catholic immigrants, hailing from Southern and
Eastern Europe, were unwilling and unable to challenge the authority of the Irish in their
religious institutions.51 For example, most members of the Irish community trusted and
turned to the church to get all of their news, including international, national, and even
local community news. The Boston Pilot, the predominant news source for members of
the Boston Irish community and to this day the oldest existing Catholic newspaper in the
United States, was owned and controlled by the Archdiocese of Boston, which became a
primarily Irish dominated institution. The paper was commonly known as “The
Irishman’s bible” and included information not just on community events but also on
naturalization processes and employment opportunities, reaching far beyond the regular
material covered by more mainstream news sources.52
Religious affiliations helped to perpetuate classism and racism targeted at the
Irish community because it unfortunately taught them, by example, the benefits of being
exclusive and exclusive association with their own ethnic and religious communities.53
According to historian James O’Toole, “the tenacity of ethnic identity among Boston’s
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Catholics was powerful.”54 The Irish retreated into ethnic enclaves partially as a
convenience but also as a way of combating the exclusion they experienced in almost
every aspect of life in Boston, including but not limited to the spheres of employment and
education.55 Rather than fighting discrimination through inclusion in more mainstream
institutions, the Irish voluntarily excluded themselves from the larger community as a
defense mechanism; it was easier to be among a group of similar people who all
experienced the same types of discrimination in everyday life. In Boston, the road to a
middle-class existence and social acceptance was particularly difficult for the Irish due to
the extreme bigotry targeting the Irish and expressed by the elite upper classes.56
By the turn of the twentieth century and beyond, Boston was a completely
different city than it had been at its founding three centuries earlier, especially in terms of
ethnic diversity. Waves of immigration in the late 1880s brought new ethnic groups and
social classes into the city, particularly large immigrant groups from Southern and
Eastern Europe. By 1895 in the North End of Boston, there only remained as few as 1500
families with parents who had been born in the United States.57 As a result, the working
class Irish acquired some form of security in the Boston community by often acting as
middlemen between the Brahmins and the newer immigrants, and suffered relatively little
from the competition of arriving immigrants due to divergent industrial capacities.58
However, the lack of competition presented by the new communities did little to help the
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Irish to progress. They remained in their previous posts and spheres of employment, as
none of the new immigrants competed against them for jobs in those industries. The lack
of competition effectively helped to maintain and solidify the Irish’s low position on the
Boston social and economic hierarchy.
The Boston Irish often defined their group identity based on their relationships
with other ethnic groups, as explained by ethnic historians Kathleen Conzen and David
Gerber, and by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries these intra-ethnic
relationships had come to be reflected in the variety of residential ethnic enclaves found
across the city. Most importantly and most conspicuously, the Irish voluntarily
segregated themselves from the city’s steadily growing Italian Catholic population. This
segregation changed little over time, and continued well through the twentieth century, at
least through the 1970 Federal Census.59 Just as the Brahmins had been intolerant of the
Irish, the Irish were similarly intolerant of new immigrant populations who were seen as
“unwelcome interlopers” and often became the victims of petty persecution and
discrimination.60 Despite the discrimination and persecution experienced by the Irish, the
Irish were unwelcoming of newer and populous groups. The Irish resented the intrusion
of the Italians into their territory, and felt threatened by the large population of new
immigrants. They were forced to compete for survival in many spheres of society despite
the fact that the Irish had been settled in the city for far longer, as the Irish had been
unable to improve their general economic situation since their initial arrival. The Irish
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responded to this intrusion in the only way they felt would be successful at scaring the
Italians away: by being territorial and utilizing gang violence and intimidation, for which
Boston ethnic communities have become notorious.61 For many, the only way to stay safe
was to remain in one’s own ethnic ghetto, especially because each section of the city was
fairly well defined. In fact, nowhere in the city were there areas in which Irish and
Italians were integrated in any appreciable capacity; in districts with some kind of ethnic
diversity, the Irish and the Italians clustered together in tenement houses and minidistricts, still adhering to group boundaries. 62
Despite the fact that some groups cooperated well with the Irish, like the Jews
who were begrudgingly respected due to their continual suffering for their religious
convictions and way of life, and that second-generation immigrants seemed to get along
better than their predecessors, William Foote Whyte observed with regards to the IrishItalian conflict that “the sentiments of race superiority or inferiority are too deeply
ingrained to be decisively changed in two or three generations.”63 Woods observed in his
1903 study of Boston ethnic communities through the South End House that there was
little interaction among these groups within the city.64 In all, the conflict between the
Irish and the Yankee-Brahmins as well as the Irish and the Italians persisted well through
the beginnings of the twentieth century and the era of the First World War.
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The conditions under which the Boston Irish were forced to live reflected their
relationship to other Boston communities both ethnically and economically. Districts of
the city housing the Irish working class community grew to be the most congested
sections with the highest rents, due to each district’s high land values and vicinity to the
city’s traffic.65 The South End, West End, and East Boston, notably Irish districts, were
characterized by rows of flats along narrow passageways with extremely high rents,
while most non-Irish, in contrast, had begun to take advantage of the rise of the suburbs
and improvements in rapid transit, moving out to communities boasting better living
conditions.66 The working class Irish were isolated both culturally as well as
geographically from other Bostonians, which merely furthered negative stereotypes and
images of their community. Though the existence and prevalence of the ‘No Irish Need
Apply’ slogan in classifieds and job advertisements may have just been a myth,
especially given the lack of concrete evidence of the slogan’s use, the Irish capitalized on
the urban legend of its existence in order to increase Irish solidarity and protect
community members from further discrimination.67 Following the Brahmin example of
emphasizing the importance of ‘family consciousness’ as a key to upward social
mobility, the Irish tended to stick to their own community and support those with whom
they felt ethnically connected.68
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By the outbreak of the First World War, the economic position of the Irish
community, especially in relation to the Brahmin elite, had changed little despite the
influx of new immigrants at the end of the nineteenth century upsetting the social
hierarchy and economic balance of Boston’s community. While the Irish should
theoretically have risen in the general social hierarchy as a result of impoverished
communities invading their city, the reality is that these immigrant groups rapidly
surpassed the Irish both economically and socially. Even though the Irish were fully
accepted politically and economically by the end of the nineteenth century, the Irish, as
an ethnic community, had progressed very little overall.69 By the mid 1910s, the Irish, for
the most part, still found themselves holding blue-collar jobs. Though the second
generation had managed to move upward slightly, many Irishmen still held jobs as dock
laborers, freight handlers, and teamsters.70 Contracting was also a popular field for the
Irish. Charles Logue, one of the 235 registered Irish contractors in Boston, famously built
much of Boston College as well as Fenway Park, erected in 1912.71 By 1905, almost half
of the undertakers in Boston were of Irish ancestry.72 There were a few Irish who held
jobs as substantial shopkeepers, yet most who had been skilled artisans or mechanics had
left the city limits and relocated elsewhere due to relative economic success.
In comparison to other ethnic communities, the Irish still had the lowest incomes
in the city by the start of the twentieth century. The rate paid to laborers in city
departments was lower than the salaries earned from other jobs, and even within
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municipal industries the Irish earned less than their non-Irish, ethnic counterparts. The
Irish earned approximately two dollars a day, while other groups like the Italians made
about five or six dollars a day on average.73 By the beginning of the twentieth century,
“The mass of Irishmen continued to occupy the low places in society they had earlier
held. Their wives and daughters performed most of the city’s domestic service; and men
and boys of Irish ancestry constituted the bulk of unskilled workers.”74
Though there was an immense social tension and uneasiness between the Brahmin
upper class and the Irish working class during this era, it was not always overtly
manifested in daily life. Most middle and upper class Bostonians that employed servants
preferred to hire servants of Irish descent. For example, the Gibson family, an uppermiddle class family living at 137 Beacon Street in Boston’s Back Bay, maintained a total
of seven servants throughout the Progressive Era; six of the seven live-in servants were
Irish immigrants.75 The servants kept by Edwin Curtis, the Commissioner of the Boston
Police Department during the first decades of the twentieth century, kept four servants,
three of which were born in Ireland.76 The city’s most prominent families almost
universally preferred the Irish to those from other ethnic communities, and the proper
Bostonians knew that they could not survive without the Irish, though they were still seen
as unquestionably inferior to the Brahmin community.

73

Woods, Americans in Process, 130-131.
Handlin, Boston’s Immigrants, 216.
75
Kyla Tornheim, “Tour Highlights,” Gibson House Museum Guide
Manual/Interpretation Plan. Boston, MA. Revised November 2005.
76
U.S. Census of Population and Housing, 1920, Boston Ward 8, Suffolk, Massachusetts,
Roll T625_742, Page 1B, Enumeration District 241, Image 830.
74

33
Even though Boston’s upper class and the Irish working class coexisted in peace
within many domestic spaces, these interactions often served to increase, rather than
diminish, tensions between the two groups. The ‘Irish servant girl’ stereotype persisted in
Boston for many decades, and helped to increase and perpetuate the rising distrust of the
Irish community at large. Many Bostonians regarded these women as servants of the
Pope, due to their devotion to Catholicism, and their presence in the finest homes of the
city generally made the Brahmins uneasy.77 Because these women were often the only
Irish with whom the Brahmins regularly interacted, Irish immigrant women unwillingly
served as ambassadors and representatives of the entire Boston Irish community.
Despite a variety of setbacks, the one industry in which the Irish were able to
succeed and prosper in a very public way, advancing even beyond the Brahmin
community, was municipal politics. By the 1890s, one-third of the Irish families in the
North and West Ends of Boston earned their primary income from a family member
involved in the political arena.78 By the mid 1880s, the first man of Irish origin, Hugh
O’Brian, was elected as the Mayor of Boston, and other famous Irishmen like James
Michael Curley and John F. Fitzgerald, the maternal grandfather of President John F.
Kennedy held the position for the following decades.79 The First Irish congressman from
Boston, Patrick Collins, was elected in 1884.80 Many of the Irish who had been able to
work their way through the system of higher education found themselves working in
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politics, using the legal profession as their door to success. Many historians, including
Dennis P. Ryan, have understood the Irish community’s failed attempt to progress and
succeed in Boston culture and society as the result of their unmatched success in the
realm of politics and the Boston labor movement.81 In fact, the progressive politics
gaining popularity in the first decades of the twentieth century handicapped working class
activism and power, as organizations representing only a particular segment of the
working class, like, “unions and workers’ associations, could not easily act as the voice
of a unified community.”82
Just as the Irish controlled Boston’s municipal government, by the mid 1910s
members of the Irish working class community almost completely controlled the Boston
labor movement, giving the Brahmins yet another reason to unify in opposition to the
increasingly cohesive Boston Irish working class. The Boston Central Labor Union
(BCLU), a parent organization and umbrella body of many of the local craft unions in
Boston, was an Irish run affiliate of the American Federation of Labor.83 In fact, not just
the leadership but also the membership of the BCLU was primarily Irish. They were
mostly politically well connected and indeed often found themselves pushing for and
successfully aiding the passage of labor reforms and legislation.84
While members of the Irish community seemed to hold many of the most
prominent government positions, the majority of the Boston Irish lacked a significant
mount of political power. The most isolated groups in the new political system were
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undoubtedly working class ethnic communities, and it is into this category that most of
the Irish fell, with no personal connections to the centers of political power.85 Despite the
number of Irishmen involving themselves in politics and the legal world, most members
of this community remained fairly insignificant. Though the first Irish-born member of
the Suffolk County Bar joined in the 1840s, only six of the 65 judges appointed to the
superior court and one of the 28 appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts between 1865 and 1913 were of Irish descent.86
Because of these strong public affiliations of many Irish Bostonians, the Yankee
and the Irish immigrant communities came to tolerate each other without truly living in
harmony with one another. While the Yankees continually pushed progressive reform and
government restructuring in order to end Irish machine rule, the Irish, who controlled the
city government as a result of these types of reforms, and the Yankees were able to
cooperate out of political necessity.87 While cooperation between groups may have given
the rest of the world the appearance of mutual respect between the ethnic and native
communities in their varying realms of cultural control, the cooperation was the result of
the ability to tolerate each other while staying at arms length, respecting each spheres of
influence without imposing on the other group’s power.88 While earlier Brahmins may
have accepted democratic institutions and the Irish community’s rise to power within
them, the second and third generation Brahmins and their descendants grew increasingly
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bitter toward the Irish working class, condemning not only technology but also
immigration, labor unions, class conflict, socialism, and the city in general.89
Even though the Irish community had become much more organized by the World
War I era, Boston’s Brahmin society was much more unified than the Irish community
and harder to penetrate than ever before. Because many wealthy Bostonians had moved
out to developing suburbs like Brookline and Milton, the Brahmin elite left within the
city limits consolidated themselves geographically and increased the intensity of their
community ties due to the exclusive character of the remaining population.90 Generally,
the rich and educated of the Boston community, mirroring the rich and educated in the
rest of the country, neglected the poor and mostly ignored their existence with the
exception of during election season; this allowed the Brahmins to create a cohesive
community that interacted little with surrounding and local ethnic communities, only
further isolating the Boston elite.91 Proper Bostonians were extremely loyal to their own
and attached to their fellow Brahmins, “follow[ing] them blindly because he knows they
rose to the top naturally,” and turning their leaders into a type of institution.92
After the 1880s, most Brahmins were able to make a living in the sphere of
investment banking, rather than industry.93 Though they no longer ruled industrial or
political life in the city, the Brahmins still ruled “the museum, the academy, the dinner
table, and the club,” which made cultural understanding an essential characteristic by
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which the Brahmins could distinguish themselves.94 By the first few decades of the
twentieth century, the Brahmins had so entrenched their ideals and identity into the class
structure of Boston society that it was nearly impossible to successfully challenge the
existing traditions and framework by which Boston was organized.
As a result of the establishment of clear social and economic class distinctions
between the Boston Brahmins and the Boston Irish coupled with, and intensified by, the
increasing unification of these divergent and opposing communities, “The perception of
increasing ethnic harmony would fade, to be replaced in less than two decades by a new
story of long-standing conflict that formed the context in which local group identities
took shape.”95 By the end of the First World War, Boston was on the road to disaster. The
Boston Police Strike of 1919 would prove to be the culminating event in the century-long
escalation of ethnic tensions in Boston and a fervent attempt to restructure society based
on population rather than tradition.
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Chapter 2: Police Work, Public Unionization, and the Boston Police Department
The beginning of the twentieth century was a crucial era in the history of the
Boston Police Department, often referred to as the beginning of the era of police
professionalism. The most notable of the many administrative changes the Department
underwent gave the newly created position of Boston Police Commissioner a tremendous
amount of power, and the transformation of the department into a modern institution
heightened tensions between the ethnic employees of the police department and the upper
class communities that they were required to protect. A series of municipal leaders with
little to no understanding of the people composing Boston’s population transformed the
police department into a classist institution, while members of Boston’s working class
rapidly began to join the growing national movement to organize public employees as a
method of combating their increased social and economic marginalization within
Boston’s society. The First World War changed how varied American communities
understood each other, particularly within the context of patriotic loyalty and national
identity, and contributed to the heightened tensions among Boston’s ethnic and native
communities. The issue of public sector unionism, particularly police unionization and
the creation of the Boston Police Union, and the eventual occurrence of the Boston Police
Strike exposed the world to a clash between upper class Boston Brahmins and their
immigrant, working class neighbors that had been in constant opposition for almost a
century.
As detailed by urban historian Eric Monkkonen, American policemen only began
to assume the primary role of urban crime control in the late nineteenth century. In fact,

39
police forces as we now know them did not exist until fairly recently. Until the midnineteenth century, there were no organized police organizations or crime-fighting
institutions; the only existing posts resembling police work were as night watchmen and
constables who worked directly under the court systems. Based on the British model,
early American policemen were meant to act as a cross between a military and civilian
force, responsible to both civil and criminal courts and meant to raise alerts about fires
and criminal acts committed throughout the city. The modern police system only came
into existence as a result of the establishment of the Metropolitan Police Force in London
in 1829.96 Shortly afterward in 1837, the Boston Police force was organized and created
as a fulltime professional force, sparked by a series of anti-Irish nativist riots and general
social unrest.97 “Compared to their British predecessors,” Monkkonen asserted, “the new
police in the United States envisioned their role as keepers of public order, dispensing
summary justice immediately on the street.”98
Originally, these early police forces had militarized hierarchies, which made them
efficient and reliable due to the effectiveness of the chain-of-command system. These
new systems were also put under the control of the executive branch of most state
governments, in contrast to the previous system that had given the state legislature
control over law enforcement. The Massachusetts General Court placed the Boston Police
Department under the control of the executive branch of the government in 1885, and the
department then began to be governed by a three man Board of Commissioners appointed
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by the governor.99 They were required to work with the municipal leaders, particularly
the mayor, yet the mayor himself had no control over the appointment of police
department leadership. Because of this change in power and organization, the police were
able to shift their focus from civil court activities, mainly preparing and prosecuting
cases, to criminal watch and public safety.100
Many of the functions of the new policemen were even unexpected by the original
creators of these forces, reaching far beyond the sphere of crime prevention. Police
patrolmen found themselves acting as city servants, taking in lost children, enforcing
sanitation laws and taking annual censuses.101 Police also dispensed forms of welfare for
which the government took no responsibility, such as caring for the disabled and the
homeless, by providing free lodging to those in need. Many station houses contained
dormitories to house overnight lodgers, mainly prostitutes or the homeless, though this
type of lodging was often inadequate and considered improper according to the moral
standards of the time.102 Even though the city built four new station houses in 1912 in
order to remedy the problem of overcrowded stations, which affected both policemen and
prisoners who were jailed in cells lacking proper lighting and ventilation, most station
houses in Boston were still considered unfit for habitation.103 A 1909 investigation into
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work conditions provided concrete proof of unsanitary conditions in Boston station
houses; they were dirty, decrepit, and often infested with rats.104
The new police forces also had required uniforms, which, though a seemingly
insignificant detail of police work, distinguished them greatly from earlier pseudo-police
forces. Uniforms made officers visible on the streets, and therefore publicly recognizable
by all citizens. Though these uniforms, called ‘popinjays’ in Boston, were originally
hated by all and seen as an infringement on Americans’ freedom to wear whatever they
wished, they increased citizen access to patrol officers as well as centralized control over
officers, as uniforms made officers easier to locate on city streets.105 The increased
visibility of the new uniformed police forces was additionally believed to deter criminals
from illegal activity. As a result, city governments were required to devise a new system
of paying law enforcement officials as previously, patrolmen were paid a commission for
catching offenders. Once policemen were required to prevent crime, rather than merely
catch active criminals, the police needed to be paid a regular salary out of the city
budget.106 Because of the new and unavoidable strains on municipal finances due to
changes in police work, most American cities did not adopt uniformed police forces until
after 1850, and American cities seemed to do so in order of population size and necessity.
Additionally, growing intolerance of riots and public disturbances of the peace sparked
the rapid adoption of police forces across the country.107 The sudden surge in crimes
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related to property theft was yet another important reason for the creation of modern
urban police departments and detective bureaus.108
Though often not obvious, much of the Boston Police Department’s activity was
motivated by social class and economic status. By the 1890s, police forces were fairly
established in most American cities. Though they looked out for the safety of the people
on their beats while simultaneously enforcing state and city statutes, it often seemed that
the police were an instrument of the upper classes, as upper class neighborhoods and
residents were often in the public eye through government connections or society
columns. However, this upper class control of the police tended to come about for other
reasons. Because patrolmen tended to respond to the demands of large and influential
groups within their beats, policemen tended to act in favor of middle and upper class
interests. Stillman S. Wakeman, a patrolman for the Boston Police Department’s Division
13 in West Roxbury Village, noted in his official journal that late nineteenth-century
residents of Boston believed that the police department’s principal job was to protect
private property.109 Patrolmen were often called upon to “discipline rowdy youth who
threatened private property, neighbors who behaved in unacceptable ways, and recent
immigrants whose alien culture provoked antipathies.”110 Policemen were called upon by
citizens, mostly businessmen and homeowners, to control and suppress the activities of
gangs of boys notorious for smashing windows and setting fires. While van Hoffman
claims that it was the behavior of the offending citizens that provoked wealthy citizens to
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submit complaints to the police, one cannot deny that these people saw the offenders,
usually from the blue-collar working class, as a threat to their property and to their
wealth, and therefore to their social standing should these thing be stripped away from
them.111 Additionally, the police helped to maintain the social equilibrium that upper
class Bostonians had worked so hard to maintain since the seventeenth century. Usually
done through corruption and bribery, the police made alliances with immigrant gangs to
prevent warfare and street disruption. In order to follow through with middle and upper
class requests for peacekeeping and general vigilance in their residential areas, it was
necessary for the police to create alliances with the gangs that were often believed to be
the source of chaos and street disturbances. This was all done for the sake of the
appearance of a stability favored by the Brahmins, though it merely suppressed the
tensions between classes within the city.112
Police patrols were organized around foot beats, during which one officer would
be assigned to the beat per shift.113 These patrolmen walked their beats alone, and helped
to “forestall crime, recover stolen property, prevent disorder, and provide other
services.”114 An 1893 manual for the Boston Police Department stated that patrolmen
were required to know their routes perfectly, examine the entryways to homes and stores
to make sure that they were secured, rid the sidewalks of loiterers, and keep an eye on
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suspicious characters.115 Additionally, they were supposed to keep order, detect fires, and
“scrutinize any illegal or immoral activity.” Their instructions were limited, and often left
open to interpretation by the officers on the beat. By telling officers that they were
constantly supposed to be watching for people who disregarded contemporary social
mores and appeared suspicious, mostly people whom the upper classes were afraid or by
whom they felt threatened, the patrolmen became far from impartial, biased by both their
socioeconomic status and that of their superiors.
Patrolmen acted as versatile officials of the neighborhoods in which they were
stationed. Patrolmen were expected to constantly be moving, walking along their routes
and never standing in one spot. In order to remedy the previous lack of discipline on the
force, the Boston Police Department required patrolmen to call their stations from call
boxes along their routes. In this way, superiors could supervise police officers to more of
an extent than in the past. Indeed, as time passed the police force became more
paternalistic and more strictly managed. Patrolmen worked seven days a week with a
fourteen-day annual paid vacation. Those on day duty worked from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., and
those on night duty, typically newly hired and lower ranking officers within the
department, worked from 6 p.m. through to 8 a.m.116
Despite their ties to many wealthy middle and upper class communities, as a
division of the executive branch and paid out of the municipal budget police workers
were almost universally poorly paid and rigidly supervised. The Boston Police Force was
no exception, even after it underwent an unparalleled number of Progressive reforms at
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the beginning of the twentieth century. In the late nineteenth century, cities had tried to
regulate scandalous behavior, marked as scandalous according to upper class values, by
creating “semilegitimate vice districts” without actually legalizing practices like
prostitution and gambling. Because of the general acceptance of these districts even by
law enforcement, local entrepreneurs and those controlling vice operations often easily
swayed the policemen who were assigned to control and regulate activities there. Bribery
was common. Policemen had a tendency to give-in to corruption as a method of
controlling these semi-legal activities, and this type of behavior reflected poorly on police
departments as a whole.117 As progressive reformers were rampantly trying to eliminate
corruption and scandal from American cities, reform within municipal police departments
seemed a logical place to begin to attack the problem. The Irish had been extremely
successful in the political arena, and by the late nineteenth century Boston’s municipal
government was almost completely controlled by members of the Irish community. John
F. Fitzgerald, elected mayor in 1905, truly believed, “the Boston Irish could legitimately
inherit the reigns of the Boston government.”118 Many middle and upper class Bostonians
believed that the restructuring of the police department, as well as the broader
restructuring of the entire municipal government, as a way to end Irish machine rule in
Boston.119 Urban police reform was so closely tied to the political history of every city
that changes in police organization often went hand in hand with the pursuance of a
variety of other political and humanitarian goals, usually those favored by the upper
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classes.120 Jacob Riis, famed muckraking journalist and photographer, like many others,
believed that police reform would lead to honest government; for many, this meant
government returned to the hands of elite, native-born, white, protestant Americans.121
By keeping an eye on the police, the wealthy elite could exert at least some control over
the immigrant working class in a world in which immigrant populations were steadily
becoming more populous and powerful.
The centralization of police agencies into a structured bureaucracy was a method
by which many believed that inefficiency and corruption could be removed from police
departments, especially because centralization would simplify the relationships between
lower ranking officers and their overseeing organizations.122 “Although their descriptions
of the exact means used to control the police tend to be imprecise, most historians assume
that centralized downtown command posts in the city government and police department
bureaucracies directed the police,” and this was so in Boston.123
One of the most important ways in which the Department was changed was with
the 1906 replacement of the three man Board of Commissioners by a single, and all
powerful, Commissioner who cooperated with the city’s mayor, traditionally also
member of the Boston Brahmin community.124 It was through this change that Stephen
O’Meara, former journalist and public activist with no political training, came to assume
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the post of Boston police commissioner.125 He understood the importance of the police
department to the city’s overall welfare, and completely revamped the law enforcement
system to ensure its effectiveness and glitch-free operation. O’Meara standardized the
methods of appointment of officers and promotional procedures, making the process
much more rigorous and centralizing the matter of promotion in his own hands as police
commissioner.126 Centralization in this way additionally helped to ensure that police
officers were loyal to the police command, consisting of middle and upper class men,
rather than to their ethnic and political groups, though the office of police commissioner
still had obvious political ties and this change did not always have the desired effect.127
O’Meara also attempted to change the way in which police officers acted on the
job, as well as how they responded to those they encountered while on duty, as an attempt
to get these men to exemplify upper class values and visions of society. He tried to
eliminate the violence that had frequently been associated with the police prior to his
reign by teaching officers to respond to violence and verbal abuse in a calm, collected
way. In 1912, he outlawed the use of the billy-club, an instrument which was very often
misused and only perpetuated the image of the violent, lawless policeman. In the period
from 1906 to 1916, there was a 93 percent increase in arrests, and the force itself grew
enormously in the twelve years of O’Meara’s tenure.128 By 1918, O’Meara had made the
Boston Police “one of the most lawful in the country,” having successfully transformed
the Department into an “effective, efficient, law-abiding and corruption-free
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organization.”129 In fact, during this era Boston saw the least amount of scandal and
controversy in comparison to other large American cities like New York and
Philadelphia.130
Despite minor improvements and honest attempts at police reform, employees of
the Boston Police Department still found themselves lacking decent working conditions
and overall fairness in the workplace throughout the beginning of the twentieth century.
Commissioner O’Meara was so concerned with establishing the Boston Police
Department as a model of efficiency and modern policing that he tended to overlook the
demands and desires of the men he employed.131 Koss argues, “In short, O’Meara’s work
suffered from his administrative myopia which kept him from seeing the larger picture –
namely, that the enduring success of his programs rested on his men, and that their
devotion and loyalty had to be kept alive by assuring them a decent standard of living and
working conditions that would sustain their professional pride.”132 The hierarchical
system which had ensured efficiency in the department, simultaneously obscured the
insistent needs for reform and improvement.133 In essence, O’Meara had created an
administration full of “bureaucratic rigidity.”
Even more significantly, the position of police commissioner had developed into a
“virtual autocrat” and held absolute power in a variety of situations, allowing him to be
influenced by his class and ethnic affiliations. Because he was not bound by civil service
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listings, the Commissioner had the power to promote anyone he wanted, as long as they
had passed the police examination.134 For example, the police administration was granted
arbitrary powers, which undermined any advances made by labor activists. Because there
were few requirements for advancement and promotion, the system and its promotional
procedures were “grossly unfair” and subject to the whims and desires of the
Commissioner and the higher-ups in the Department. The subjective judgments of
superior officers and administrators were allowed to enter into the promotional process as
biases and favoritism, and were unchecked by any other departmental regulations.135 For
example, the Police Commissioner agreed to give employees a 24-hour holiday for every
eight days of work, except this time off could be taken away at will by the Commissioner
himself. Patrolmen were expected to work a regular day shift of 73 hours or and 83 hours
night shift, often working up to 17 hours a day.136 During World War I, policemen’s
workload reached an all time high as a result of the combined hours required by a
combination of police work and tours of duty for the federal government.137 With this
extreme power placed in the hands of the Police Commissioner, the patrolmen were
continuously subject to his abuse of power. Boston Police Commissioners took such
advantage of their position of power that patrolmen, primarily members of the Irish
community, were subjected to horrific station conditions, minimal salaries, and
continuous overwork, and they were granted no effective outlets for expressing their
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grievances. The office of Police Commissioner used its power to squeeze as much work
out of the employees at the smallest cost to the Department, and each Commissioner was
able to manipulate the force to further their personal goals and to the benefit of any group
favored by the man holding the position.
While it became increasingly easy for the Police Commissioner to abuse his
power and make the lives of his employees more difficult, the material conditions of the
worker decreased as a result of a rising cost of living and the inefficient reform of the
wage system within the Boston Police Department. In the time between 1898 and the end
of the First World War, the cost of living in Boston rose a shocking 106 percent, mostly
as a result of Boston’s booming wartime munitions industry and numerous shipyards
drawing large amounts of income and an influx of labor into the city. 138 Patrolmen were
required to work for six years in order to earn the maximum possible salary, working on a
graduated pay scale. During their first year, they were given the title of “reserve men”
and paid only two dollars a day, and their second year they were given a raise of a mere
25 cents. From there, they were promoted to the post of “patrolman,” and were paid an
annual salary.139 Though they were granted a raise in 1898, the wage increase was not put
into effect until 1913.140 Even with a general raise in the Spring of 1919, the first in six
years, patrolmen were only earning $4.38 a day, or half as much as a carpenter and a
whole 50 cents less than municipal transit workers. Policemen made only $1,100 a
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year.141 On top of their miniscule salaries, patrolmen were additionally required to buy
their own uniforms and equipment, things without which their job could not be done
properly. In the year 1919, policemen were required to devote $207 to such equipment
required by their job.142 In the end, the unlimited power granted to the Police
Commissioner coupled with the patrolmen’s inability to change their material working
conditions under such a bureaucratic system would lead Boston’s police patrolmen to
illegal unionization and strike, seen as the only method by which to improve their
situations.
Just as attempts at reform had failed to rid the department of power abuse and
misunderstanding by the police administration, conditions improved little for employees
of the Boston Police Department, despite attempts at reform, as a result of the primarily
Irish employee base. The Boston Police Department had a unique tie to the Boston Irish
community, especially because of its connection to the municipal government in Boston.
American police departments in general have been important employers of immigrants,
yet the Irish were the most notable group influenced by police work. Interestingly, the
ability to appoint people to the position of Boston Police Commissioner was put in the
hands of the governor mainly as a method of in combating, rather than administering, the
Irish “takeover” of the Boston municipal government.143 Yet, the police department
somehow managed to survive as an Irish dominated organization. Even in southern cities
and cities dominated by non-Irish ethnic populations, the Irish seemed to dominate
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municipal police forces.144 Due to the steady and reliable nature of police work, the Irish
tended to feel comfortable in that occupation no matter their population size or
geographic location.145 The Boston Police Force, too, was primarily composed of men of
Irish descent. Of the nineteen patrolmen who were heavily involved in the leadership of
the Boston Police Union, at least four were born in Ireland and another four patrolmen
were second-generation Irish immigrants.146 While there had already been rampant
stereotyping of Irish communities throughout the United States prior to their complete
domination of the ethno-political scene, the Irish, in their particularly visible positions as
government employees and law enforcement officials, seemed to perpetuate stereotypes
merely by acting as a presence on city streets. People of all classes came into constant
contact with Irish immigrants outside of their homes, and they relied on them for
protection and safety in their daily lives. This created an interesting dilemma, in that a
single interaction between a citizen and a police officer can influence their perceptions, as
well as the perceptions of their friends and relatives of the police department in its
institutional entirety.147
When O’Meara stepped down from his position as Boston Police Commissioner,
the issue of Irish domination of the police force suddenly became crucial to the course of
Boston history as a result of the new Commissioner’s non-Irish background. In 1919,
Edwin Upton Curtis was appointed as Police Commissioner when Stephen O’Meara
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stepped down from the post. Curtis was strikingly different from his predecessor, and
these differences eventually helped to increase the developing chaos within the Boston
Police Department because he was unable to relate to or understand the people above
whom he worked. At the time of his appointment, he was 57 years old. He was born in
Massachusetts, as were both of his parents. He had had two daughters with his wife
Margaret, both teenagers during the 1910s, and the Curtis family continually kept a
variety of servants. 148 He graduated from Bowdoin College and went on to practice law
for two years before becoming interested and involved in politics. In 1906, he was
appointed by President Roosevelt as the Assistant U.S. Treasurer at Boston, and went on
to hold a variety of governmental posts in the following years.149 Having held the post of
Solicitor of Boston within the government, as well as holding the title of youngest mayor
the city of Boston ever had at the young age of 34, he seemed an appropriate choice to
succeed O’Meara due to his previous involvement in municipal government. 150
Unfortunately, however, Curtis had little experience with police departments and
a limited understanding of police affairs, especially with regard to the people employed
by the Boston Police Department.151 Unlike O’Meara, who was a Canadian immigrant of
Irish descent despite his membership in Boston’s upper class, Curtis had few qualities
connecting him to the vast Irish majority of Boston’s population. In politics, and in life,
“Curtis personified the Boston Brahmin…He had inherited wealth, Republicanism, and ‘a
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profound faith in the divine right of the propertied classes ultimately to rule.’” He had an
advanced education which immediately set him apart from the majority of Boston’s
population. He epitomized everything the Irish and ethnic working classes were not, and
as a result was often considered to be an anachronism in the political scene because of his
traditional ties and beliefs.152 He was seen as a “stern, uncompromising autocrat.”153 He
understood those outside of his social class little, and, as a result of his ignorance, he was
never able to anticipate any of the events that would occur during his reign as Police
Commissioner.154
He had a particular disdain for the Irish community because of their domination
of the Boston municipal government, which undoubtedly colored his interactions with the
primarily Irish Boston Police Force. Growing up, the Brahmins, the ruling class in every
aspect of Boston society, and had been so since the late eighteenth century. When the
Irish began to gain power, especially political power, Curtis, like many in his social
position, felt threatened. He saw Boston as the upper class intellectual utopia it once was,
and was unable to accept the changing demographic realities of the city without
resentment. As a result, he “despised this new emerging group with its alien religion and
its eye for political plunder,” and truly believed that the only way Boston could return to
its golden age, the Boston he so idealized, was by eliminating all Irish influence from
positions of power in the city government. One of the primary reasons he accepted the
position of Police Commissioner was to assert some control over the Boston Irish
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community, and he unabashedly treated the employees of the police department as
uncultured and power hungry foreigners threatening the reign of the only legitimate rulers
of the city.155
Many holding powerful positions in the municipal government felt a similar
hatred and lack of understanding toward the Boston Irish, and this was evident in their
dealings with police employees. Of these people, the most significant and influential were
the Boston police commissioner, the governor of Massachusetts, and the mayor of
Boston.
Calvin Coolidge, the governor of Massachusetts elected in 1918, was similarly
unable to relate to the employees of the Boston Police Department as a direct result of his
stereotypically Brahmin upbringing. He was born in the state of Vermont, as were both of
his parents, and he went on to become a well-respected lawyer residing in Hampshire
County, Massachusetts. He had a wife and three children.156 Before being elected as
Governor, Coolidge had been the President of the Massachusetts State Senate and had
held a number of other posts at the state level.157 He was considered to be a “puritan
democrat, steeped in the traditional Calvinist beliefs of the sanctity of private property
and the high worth of honest work and saving,” making him particularly unsympathetic
towards the immigrant poor. He generally favored an increase in the scope of
governmental activity and feared the spread of radicalism; with little support for
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socialism and socialist reforms, Coolidge was a true believer in the idea that with an
increase in productivity and business prosperity inevitably comes the improvement of
working conditions.158 Coolidge was also notorious for his passive and mild-mannered
personality. Described as “thrifty not only of money but also of speech and of
unnecessary action,” Coolidge tended to let events run their course and intervened only
when absolutely necessary.159 Despite that, he had a reputation for firm and courageous
decisions, and was absolutely committed to the rule of law. He spent most of his time
working ‘behind-the-scenes,’ accumulating power and influence slowly and out of the
public eye.160
Calvin Coolidge suffered from the what historian Frederick Koss refers to as
socio-politico myopia, embodying a narrow-minded outlook on society making one
unable to understand those outside of one’s one socio-political group. For Coolidge, this
meant that the only people with whom he felt connected were those with a similar
socioeconomic upbringing and ethnic background. He was often considered to be an
ineffective leader because of his inability to govern a city of people with whom he at little
in common. Like Curtis, who also suffered from Koss’s socio-politico myopia, Coolidge
was completely unable to understand the temper and actions of the employees of the
Boston Police Department because of their ties to the ethnic working class community, a
community with which Coolidge was absolutely unfamiliar.161
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The Mayor of Boston also suffered from a similar “myopia.” Andrew J. Peters,
though not necessarily anti-Irish, did little to encourage harmony and reconciliation
between the Brahmins and their Irish neighbors. When he assumed the position of mayor
in 1918, he became only the second non-Catholic, or Yankee, to hold the position of
mayor in the period between 1884 and 1918.162 He was 46 years old, married, and had
three young sons.163 Like Coolidge, he exemplified the best of upper class Boston. Peters
was of colonial descent, came from a family with much inherited wealth, and attended
Harvard with the rest of the Brahmin community. In fact, many of the old Bostonians saw
him as a “sign of the city’s redemption from the Celts. He was in the Social Register. He
was wealthy enough to be personally honest.”164 Those of Boston’s upper class believed
Peters would save them from Irish rule of the city, similar to the earlier belief that police
reform would liberate Boston from Irish domination.
A defining characteristic of Peters, which set him apart from other Brahmin
politicians, was that he somehow stood outside of the “Bay State Federalist tradition,”
and politically labeled himself as a Yankee Democrat.165 Although he was personally
honest, this was not so in his professional life. He was particularly inept at city
administration, earning him a reputation of being “neither emotionally nor intellectually
equipped for the staggering job of administering a polyglot community such as Boston.”
He was highly influenced by ward bosses, appointing people they suggested to high posts
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in his administration, and he was often so trusting of their opinion that Peters would sign
documents without even reading them.166 Thomas Silver went so far as to claim that
Peters is usually remembered as “a playboy, a part-time mayor, and a womanish man
who at the moment of greatest danger to his city showed himself to be weak, frightened,
and hysterical.”167
The First World War changed how Americans, and likewise Bostonians, viewed
themselves and their communities and affected how communities within urban settings
interacted among themselves. In fact, America’s experience with the war completely
altered how Americans viewed the role of government, the economy, and national
identity. Though the war did not destroy the Progressive movement which had
characterized the first decade of the twentieth century, it did effectively end most
American reform movements.168 The war was “revolutionary in nature.” It smashed
people’s idealistic and old-fashioned values, and America’s involvement in such a largescale international conflict broadened people’s horizons and expanded the possibilities of
what could come to fruition within their own borders.169 Throughout the duration of the
war, management and labor had artificially found harmony through government
regulation, and many, like Elisha Friedman, a statistician in the War Finance Corporation,
felt that it was possible to maintain this harmony following the armistice.170 After the
war, many Americans believed that they had ensured that the world was a place in which
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democracy could prosper and rule, and they constantly looked for ways to ensure that the
democracy they had created was maintained and intensified.171 Some believed that the
growing upsurge in radicalism threatened the democracy the United States had fought to
defend during the First World War, and the government acted in response to this
supposed threat by creating anti-radical policies and programs that were enacted
nationwide. Many Americans wholeheartedly worked toward resolving disputes and
viewed the United States an example of democracy and happiness for the rest of the
world, and in order to do this it was necessary to suppress labor activity and minimize
any opposition to traditional American norms.
In Boston, as in the rest of the country, the ethnic affiliations so central to
people’s social identities quickly evolved into patriotic affiliations and ties to their newly
formed American identities. Native Bostonians felt threatened by the idea of the
foreigner, and began to view immigrants and those they considered to be un-American as
a threat to not just American society but to the very foundations of America’s democratic
way of life. Bostonians, like most Americans, became hypersensitive to their community
ties and channeled their uneasiness into Americanizing those they considered to be the
biggest threat to their homogeneity: immigrants.172 Because immigrants in general were
viewed as an anti-American group despite the extreme diversity among immigrant
communities, Boston soon became much more divided along class lines rather than
ethnic lines. What had previously been a struggle between native Bostonians and the Irish
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soon evolved into part of the larger class struggle occurring across the country, pitting the
Brahmin elite against the a segment of the working class.
By 1919, many immigrants nationwide felt that the only alternative to deportation
was assimilation, thereby eliminating many of their ethnic and political ties in favor of
creating a conglomerated unified working class. Since the American elite, the Boston
Brahmins included, generally believed that the key to maintaining America’s status in the
world was to “Americanize” immigrants, especially those who could challenge
democracy by preaching “radical notions” tied to their alien origins, many ethnic
communities quickly tried to prove their loyalty to the United States and to American
ideals.173 Yet, many Irish often openly showed their animosity towards Bolshevism and
communist movements as a method of proving their Americanism, as shown through
Boston-based working class publications. The Boston Labor World, the official
newspaper of the Irish dominated Boston Central Labor Union, continually printed
advertisements warning against Bolshevism and eliminating any rumors of affiliations
with such movements. For example, a full-page advertisement in March 1919 entitled
“Against Bolshevism” read, “Standing firmly united under the torch of Liberty, American
Capital and Labor are mutually resolved to brook no interference in their common
interests by the destructive forces of Bolshevism…the hostile torch of Bolshevism must
be kept from our shores.”174 In July 1919, the Boston Labor World made clear yet again
that the American labor movement had absolutely no affiliation to the recent revolution
in Russia, reading:
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Since American Labor has helped make the world safe for Democracy, it can be
depended upon to make it safe from Bolshevism… American Labor will tolerate
no ism that conspires and plots to undermine American Industry...Men who
conspire and plot and who lend a ready ear to Bolshevism are marked by
American Labor, and when the hour is ripe American Labor will drive them
out.175
The fear of Bolshevism exhibited by the upper classes of Boston was appropriated by the
Irish working class community as a method of distancing itself from any rumors of
radicalism and anti-Americanism.
Though the Irish had a difficult time overcoming their associations with the
Catholic Church, especially because many had heard rumors that American Catholics had
taken an oath to be loyal to the Pope over all else including the United States, they were
able to use their contributions to the war effort as a way to again prove their true
allegiance to the United States.176 They saw World War I as an opportunity to prove their
loyalty, patriotism, and bravery while winning the approval of other Americans.177 By
1919, upper class Americans wanted security from foreign influence and radicalism, and
they believed they had found this through the perpetuation of an intense American
nationalism.178 Foreign ethnics and immigrants who remained in the United States
following the war believed it was their duty to prove their commitment to American
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democracy. 179 To many members of the working class, this meant a commitment to
equality and justice in the workplace, and the ethnic working class fought hard to ensure
this type of localized democracy despite the fact that this struggle ultimately deepened
the division between the upper and working classes.
Even though the struggle for workplace equality became much more publicized
following the end of the First World War, Boston and the United States more broadly
already had a long history with the labor movement and public unionization by this time.
Public employees had begun to organize in the 1830s, yet opposition to their organization
did not begin until the 1880s when the postal workers began to create local unions.180 In
fact, until the end of World War I, public unions enjoyed relatively few barriers and were
often successful in their endeavors. In 1906, the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
created its first national union specifically for government workers; the creation of the
National Federation of Post Office Clerks began to increase interest in public sector
unionization, and opened workers’ eyes to the possibility of organized labor in
government industries.181 Immediately following this and as a result of the increased
realization of the power of public sector labor unions, the country saw a variety of public
sector strikes at the beginning of the twentieth century. In New York City, Street cleaners
and garbage and ash collectors struck in both 1906 and 1911.182 Unaffiliated public

179

Conzen, Kathleen Neils, and David A. Gerber. "The invention of ethnicity: A
perspective from the U.S.A." Journal of American Ethnic History 12, no. 1 (Fall 1992):
53.
180
Slater, Public Workers, 16.
181
Joseph Slater, “Public Workers: Labor and the Boston Police Strike of 1919,” Labor
History 38 no.1 (Winter 1996-1997): 8.
182
Slater, Public Workers, 17.

63
unions struck across the country as well, beginning even before the turn of the century; an
unaffiliated police union in Ithaca, NY went on strike in 1889, and another in Cincinnati
struck in 1918.183 This type of public unionization ultimately inspired other government
employees to seek union charters and to utilize strikes and walkouts as a method of
protest, particularly due to their unprecedented success rate. It was not unreasonable for
police workers to expect the same types of protections within the law enforcement
industry, especially after watching other public employees achieve so much in this arena.
Policemen in Boston had sought some type of organization and outlet for united
action beginning in the late nineteenth century, yet their only success had been the
creation of the Boston Social Club. In response to the demands of workers calling for a
union of Boston policemen, Stephen O’Meara had established the Boston Social Club in
1906 as a crucial part of his overhaul and reformation of the entire Boston Police
Department.184 Designed as a fraternal group for the lowest-ranking police officers rather
than as a traditional union, it spanned across precinct boundaries uniting police workers
across the city.185 It was generally ineffective as an outlet for the workers, however,
because the Boston Social Club was still completely under the control of Commissioner
O’Meara, and later Commissioner Curtis, and the Boston Police Department. Acting as
nothing more than a social club, the organization was an “ineffectual
instrument…incapable of bringing about reforms.”186 John McInnes, later President of
the Boston Police Union, called the Boston Social Club “a week-kneed organization,
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controlled by police officials.” Department officials fixed elections, ignored the club’s
requests, and even assigned Club representatives to less desirable duties within the
Department. Unsurprisingly, given the Department’s stand on strikes and radicalism, one
of the duties assigned as a punishment to those heavily involved in the Boston Social
Club was called “strike duty,” during which their sole job was to monitor and suppress
striking workers throughout the city.187 The Boston Social Club was mainly intended as a
way to keep police workers complacent and allied with business, and many members of
the upper class believed its creation was a crucial step in the prevention of true police
unionization.188 Due to the lack of understanding of those employed by the Boston Police
Department, Brahmins in the government expected patrolmen to be content with the
Boston Social Club and stop demanding real change, even though the workers were able
to gain very little from the organization. The Boston Social Club had been thoroughly
“throttled by headquarters and emasculated by departmental red tape,”189 and workers
began to become agitated by their lack of power and few opportunities to initiate change.
Though Curtis had attempted to pacify police workers by creating grievance committees
of elected officials in each station house, by the end of World War I police workers
remained without a union or any other organization through which they could truly air
their grievances and have any hope of creating reform.190
Public union organizations across the country began to grow so rapidly that the
government responded by formally recognizing the right of federal workers to organize,
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despite the limitations still imposed on public employees. The Lloyd-Lafollette Act,
officially recognizing that public workers had a formal right to organize, was passed in
1912.191 It paved the way for public sector unions across a variety of industries; however,
groups like the postal workers were still prohibited from joining unions and asserting the
right to strike.192 World War I helped to increase the number of public workers that were
organized, especially because of the “enlarged role of the state in the war-time economy.”
Also, the increased number of Americans working in wartime industries put many more
workers in the position of holding a public sector, federal job; in fact, approximately 9
million Americans were employed in war-related industries in 1918.193
In Massachusetts, where early twentieth century police unionism would
eventually meet its doom, public sector strikes were unusually commonplace. Workers
struck in both the Charlestown Navy Yard in 1914 and at the Watertown arsenal in 1911
over Taylorist methods, and Boston carpenters struck in 1918. Outside of the state
capital, public sector strikes were just as common as within the city. Springfield garbage
and ash collectors staged a massive walkout in 1917; the same industry saw similar
walkouts in Lawrence, Lowell, and Newburyport. In April 1919, 20,000 employees of the
New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, which was under the control of the
government, went on an illegal strike for six days.194 By the time the Boston Police
Department went on strike, they assumed that this method of protesting their working
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conditions and demanding change would be successful and indeed cause few disruptions
within the everyday functioning of society.
The next step in the public unionization movement was affiliation with a national
labor organization, ensuring legitimacy and national recognition and support. Public
sector organizing increased exponentially during the war, and as it grew, more and more
unions sought affiliation with the AFL in particular. The American Federation of
Teachers was created in 1916, and the National Federation of Federal Employees was
formed a year later. The National Association of Letter Carriers, which had been
originally founded in 1889, as well as the Railway Mail Carriers affiliated with the AFL.
In 1918, The International Association of Fire Fighters was founded. The AFL believed
that public employees were “members of the working class who shared values and
aspirations with private sector employees.” 195 In general, the American Federation of
Labor helped these unions to fight for the same things as employees in private sector
unions, primarily collective bargaining rights and improved wages and hours.196
By the end of World War I, the labor movement in Boston was in a precarious
position, attempting to win and ensure rights of the working class, which had been done
in Boston for decades before, while simultaneously being persecuted by upper class
Bostonians and government officials for assumed radicalism and anti-democratic
policies. American society was suffering a general chaos as a result of the war, and the
year 1919 was a year of “red scare” and “unprecedented militancy by workers.”197 The
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war may have brought many advances to organized labor,198 yet those gains came at a
steep price. The year 1919 saw more strikes than ever before, involving over 4,160,348
workers;199 Massachusetts alone saw 396 strikes, the most in a single year since 1887
when records began to be kept.200 Generally, these strikes were dealt with and tolerated,
one of the reasons the Boston police workers did not foresee the massive struggle which
occurred, yet the reason these strikes were relatively uneventful was because they did not
seem to threaten the stability of business and the economy. Rather, the Boston Police
Strike of September 1919 questioned the status quo and the role of the police in relation
to the economic upper class, a characteristic that distinguished this strike from previous
police strikes.201 This was especially so, as the police were seen as symbol of order, at
least to the upper classes, in a society wrought with disarray.202 The police workers
wanted to establish themselves as members of the working class majority, deserving of
the same rights and privileges as other workers in both the public and private sector had
successfully done, yet the police were a necessary component in the maintenance of
stability and democracy that the police strike threatened.
The question and issue of police unionization offered Americans with a challenge
somewhat separate from the issues of other types of public unionization. Over the years,
the police had been known as labor opponents, frequently being called upon to break
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strikes or attack worker protests.203 Even though the police had evolved into a true career
rather than a mere “political plum” by the end of the First World War,204 many people
were hostile towards the idea of unionizing the police due to their frequent anti-union
actions.205 When a police group in Cleveland had attempted to organize and applied for a
union charter from the AFL in 1897, the AFL told them that organizing policemen was
akin to unionizing the military, and the trade union movement cannot organize a group
“controlled by forces inimical to the labor movement.”206 Though the police patrolmen
saw themselves as a body unified through class and ethnicity, the AFL and members of
the upper class often viewed the unionization of police as contradictory to the role of
policemen within a society.
Yet, after observing the lack of opportunities for police unionization and receiving
numerous applications for union charters from police departments around the country, the
AFL voted at their June 1919 convention to begin issuing charters to police unions upon
the receipt of a proper application.207 Police Departments began submitting requests for
charters in outrageous numbers; the AFL almost immediately granted charters to 37
locals spanning 21 different states.208
Despite the many official restrictions and prohibitions against police unionization
which were imposed in Boston, many Boston police officers felt that the only way to
achieve better working conditions and improve their general standard of living was to
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unionize in affiliation with the American Federation of Labor, especially because of the
complete failure of the upper class and administration controlled Boston Social Club. The
patrolmen involved in the Boston Social Club met on August 1, 1919, and at this meeting
they created the Boston Police Union. A secret vote was held to determine if the newly
formed union would apply for an official charter from the AFL, and the patrolmen
unanimously voted, unanimous due to the fact that only 940 of the 1544 patrolmen
participated in the voting, to affiliate with the AFL.209 On August 8, 1919, the Boston
Police Union wired for a charter, and the AFL granted them an official union charter on
the following day.210 The first meeting of the Boston Police Union was held on August
19, 1919, and from then on the Boston Police Union became a target of the government
and an institution which, in the eyes of the upper classes, needed to be eliminated
immediately because it threatened the community which the members were paid to
protect.211
Many members of Boston’s Brahmin class believed that public sector
unionization would disrupt essential services provided by the government, and that police
work is one of the most essential government services.212 Police unionization would
jeopardize the trust the general citizenry had gained in the police as a result of
progressive police reforms, as trust will inevitably be lost once the law enforcers, those
meant to ensure that citizens are acting in accordance with law, are immune from these
same legal policies they are charged with enforcing. If police were allowed to unionize
209
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and strike while other groups were continuously suppressed by the government and the
police, they would be blatantly showcasing the hypocrisy of the Brahmin police
officials.213 Police Commissioners everywhere seemed to welcome unaffiliated police
organizations, yet felt threatened by the idea of a police union affiliated with the AFL
because it might sacrifice the “independence” of a police department. They worried about
divided loyalty and favoritism when unionized police would be required to handle strikes,
because they might be less likely to follow orders from the government, and therefore the
upper class, if they were allied with other organized workers.214 Additionally, as
Goldsmith claims “police officers are, by function, training and experience, suspicious,”
police unionization would threaten the control and power the Brahmin leadership had
over their ethnic, working-class police force.215 In the eyes of many, it would be
impossible for those responsible for policing radicalism to become those who needed
policing. The Boston Police Strike was a method by which the police workers looked to
improve their working conditions while simultaneously upholding American ideals, yet
most upper class Bostonians saw their fight as a simple disregard of duty, democracy, and
respect for traditional social organization.
The Boston Police Department, like police departments and city administrations
in many other locales, was officially mainly opposed to any type of non-company
unionization because of a fear of hostility and usurpation by the ethnic working class of
the Brahmin controlled institution. In 1918, Police Commissioner Stephen O’Meara
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issued a statement that rumors of AFL affiliation were likely to injure the efficiency and
reputation of the Boston police force.216 Only a month after the AFL began granting
charters to police unions, on July 19, 1919, Boston Police Commissioner Curtis issued a
General Order stating his disapproval of the national movement to organize municipal
police forces.217 Ten days later, he issued Rule 102 to reinforce his previous statement;
this asserted that union membership was completely incompatible with police duties and
necessarily compromised the impartiality of the police department.218 Then, on Monday,
August 11, 1919, Curtis issued General Order 110, often viewed as the immediate
catalyst and most important document pertaining to the imminent Boston Police Strike.
Explicitly prohibiting the unionization of Boston policemen, it stated:
It is or should be apparent to any thinking person that the police department of
this or any other city cannot fulfil [sic] its duty to the entire public if its members
are subject to the direction of an organization existing outside the department. It is
a well recognized fact that a police officer is not an employee but a state officer.
He is charged with impartial enforcement of the law under the direction of a
commissioner who is himself a statutory officer. The following rule interferes in
no wise in a policeman’s interests and activities as a man and citizen. It does,
however, forbid him, and the department from coming under the direction and
dictation of any organization which represents but one element or class of the
community…the following is hereby added to and made part of Section 35 of the
Rules and Regulations and designated as Section 19 of said rule: No member of
the Force shall join or belong to any organization, club or body composed of
present or present and past members of the Force which is affiliated with or a part
of any organization, club or body outside of the Department, except that a Post of
the Grand Army of the Republic, the United Spanish War Veterans and the
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American Legion of World’s War Veterans may be formed within the
Department.219
As this addition ensured that the members of the Boston Police Department could not
form or join any type of AFL affiliated union without officially going against the
department and breaking an actual rule enforced by the Commissioner, it made
unionization a seemingly punishable offense in the eyes of the Boston Police Department.
In the following few weeks, the nation began to focus its eyes on Boston and the
controversy beginning to crop up around the creation of the Boston Police Union. Despite
the prohibitions on police unionization, Commissioner Curtis attempted to appease the
members of the Boston Police Department and their newly formed union by allowing
them to unionize as long as they rescinded their charter from the AFL. Affiliation with
this type of national organization was one of the few things differentiating this union
from the previous and completely ineffective Boston Social Club, so the AFL charter was
an issue on which the members of the union were unwilling to compromise.220 Others
attempted to compromise with the union as well, in order to avoid a strike at all costs.
The most famous attempt was made by James J. Storrow and his 34-member committee,
appropriately referred to as the Storrow Committee, which had been appointed by Mayor
Peters.221 Storrow, a wealthy and respected Boston businessman, was convinced that with
higher wages and improvements in working conditions the police would readily surrender
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their AFL charter.222 Under Storrow’s direction, the committee was charged with
formally examining the situation, averting a strike or other disruption of work, and the
proposition of a settlement that could be agreed upon by both the police department
employees and the its leadership. A compromise was eventually drawn up by the
committee and submitted to both Curtis and the Boston Police Union for approval, yet
Curtis rejected the compromise and chaos broke out in the city before the union had a
chance to vote on the plan.223
On August 26, 1919, eight members of the Boston Police Union, including famed
President John McInnes, were arrested and tried for violating General Order 110. Three
days later, eleven other men were tried for the same thing, in a hearing that lasted a total
of only ten minutes, as if the Court had been planning on finding them guilty before the
trial even began. On September 7, Commissioner Curtis suspended all nineteen
patrolmen that had been tried, finding them in violation of Section 19 of Rule 35 of the
Rules and Regulations of the Police Department due to their membership in the Boston
Police Union.224 In response, an emergency meeting of the Boston Police Union was held
that night, at which all but 2 attendees voted in favor of a walkout. Consequently, 1117 of
the 1544 Boston patrolmen officially walked out on strike at 5:45 on the evening of
September 9, 1919.225 Only lower ranking patrolmen were involved in the strike. Because
those of higher rank were little affected by hierarchical abuse, they did not readily
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sacrifice their jobs in order to show their solidarity with the mass of regular police
department employees.226
In the chaos that ensued during the first weeks of September 1919, Bostonians of
all classes questioned the nature of police work and public unionization. The chronology
of the Boston Police Strike and the event’s aftermath are representative of the struggle
endured by Boston policemen to challenge the power of the Brahmins in the Boston
social hierarchy, therefore questioning the place of the Irish working class community
within hierarchy. The response of Brahmin Boston to the police strike is representative of
the upper class struggle with a changing world in the aftermath of the First World War
and the classist and nationalist attitudes generally exhibited by the wealthy American
upper class, particularly in response to labor organization and immigrant communities.
The days and weeks following the Boston Police Strike were crucial to both Boston’s
history and Boston’s society, helping to define and emphasize the traditional social
organization of the city’s population through the suppression of the police workers and
their aspirations of achieving a higher standard of living and the elimination of such rigid
class divisions.
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Chapter 3: The Boston Police Strike and Its Aftermath
The Boston Police Strike of 1919 was ultimately a failed attempt by a segment of
Boston’s Irish working class to challenge and reorganize the traditional, Brahmin based
social structure of the city, especially as many workers believed that unionization was a
way to maintain many of the gains in fairness and equality they had made during the First
World War. Enclosing a newspaper clipping with the headline, “What is a policeman?” in
his letter to Police Commissioner Curtis, Fred A. Derry offered an answer to the question
posed by a Boston periodical. He wrote, “A police-man is an ignorant person (generally
Irish,) who joins the police force to avoid work,” showing his class based prejudices and
stereotypical associations with the Irish community and obviously connecting these
‘inherent characteristics’ with their inability to properly perform their police duties.227
Many members of the Brahmin community held similar views, believing that
unionization of ethnic working class particularly in the law enforcement industry would
only enhance these negative and un-American characteristics of police officers. The only
way to maintain the traditional social structure of Boston, a structure favoring the elite,
upper class, was to suppress police union activity and the Boston Police Strike.
The efforts of the Boston Police Union were no match for the upper class
Brahmins, who asserted their elitism and power over the city’s socioeconomic life
through the suppression of union activity and public sector strikes. Upper class views of
Americanism celebrated tradition, virtue and religion, yet these views celebrated elitist
227
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understandings of these values.228 The strike threatened the social equilibrium in Boston
and went against traditionalist notions of Americanism, and the upper classes feared an
overhaul of society by the ethnic working class, which, in their view, occupied a
necessarily subordinate social position.229 The upper classes asserted their influence
through the verbal condemnation of the strike and the replacement of the striking
policemen with worthy members of the upper class as a method of suppressing working
class attempts at societal change. It did little to change the existing social hierarchy or
mitigate ethnic tensions. The end of the Boston Police Strike saw the end of a wave of
early twentieth-century public police unionization, affirmed the traditional Boston social
structure, and effectively ended policemen’s hopes of being treated as both workers and
employees until a second wave of police unionization began almost half a century later.
On the first evening of the famed walkout, September 9, 1919, the city found
itself with inadequate and extremely minimal police protection. While the arrested
patrolmen had been suspended and later officially discharged from their duties, city
leaders identified the striking officers as having “abandoned their duty.”230 Only 427
officers of a typical 700 remained on duty,231 with a mere 24 officers walking the beat in
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the city center.232 Nothing of this scale had ever occurred before, despite previous
attempts at police strikes in other parts of the country and world.233
As predicted by John Burton and Charles Krider, who argue that the deterioration
of public order occurs almost immediately after essential employees, such as firemen and
policemen, go on strike,234 Boston entered into a state of complete social chaos after the
policemen’s walkout. The city experienced an unusually high level of social turmoil and
an extreme upsurge in crime as a direct result of the lack of policemen patrolling the
streets, enough to attract national media attention. Though real rioting did not begin until
a number of hours after the official walkout at 5:45 p.m., “blatant gambling, gathering of
restive crowds, and assorted kinds of mischief and vandalism merely inaugurated the
spirit of license that later excited the city.”235 Boston experienced a state of absolute
disorder, which lasted well into the following days.
The greatest numbers of people gathered in the city’s notoriously ethnic sections,
where citizens recorded a record amount of criminal activity. In many locations, large
mobs gathered in anticipation of the walkout. In Scollay Square and South Boston, the
mob became unusually violent. In Scollay Square, the heart of Boston’s entertainment
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district and thus considered one of the most corrupt parts of the city, a battle between
rioters and guardsmen persisted until five decoy policemen with support from the
Massachusetts cavalry were ale to suppress the violence.236 In South Boston, one of the
notoriously Irish districts, three volunteer policemen were brutally attacked, two men
were killed and nine were wounded before the mob finally dispersed later in the evening
of September 10.237 A police station in South Boston, one at which a number of striking
officers were stationed, remained under siege by the mob until the state guard was
brought in.238 In some places, the police both striking and not were the victims of
physical attacks. Even other members of the Irish community attacked the police; for
example, an Irish truck driver in one area of the city yelled at, then physically assaulted,
an officer that had given him a traffic ticket amidst the chaos.239 Though strikers mostly
hailed from these sections of town and were members of those particular ethnic groups,
their own communities heavily criticized the striking officers. These areas experienced
much higher levels of violence than many of the more upper class sections of the city.
Though this violence resulted partially from the absence of patrolling policemen who
were usually needed to keep the peace and prevent crime, many other unionists, found in
these ethnic sections of the city, felt that the police strike did not represent the interests of
organized labor as a whole, but rather those belonging to a small segment of it.240
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While members of Boston’s working class community suffered much of the
physical effects of and damage from the strike, the upper classes seemed to voice their
very strong opinions on police unionization and on the strike specifically much more
frequently than their ethnic counterparts, doing so in order to rally public support for their
cause and as a method of turning people against the strikers. For example, the print media
with upper class readership in Boston and across the nation as well as an upper class
employee base continuously reported the lawlessness of Bostonians in gripping detail and
with typical journalistic exaggeration, helping to not only spread news of the strike but
also sway public opinion in favor of anti-union forces. The main headline on the front
page of the September 10 Boston Post read, “City in grip of mob; loot stores; reign of
terror,” indicating the level of pandemonium being experienced throughout the city while
simultaneously attaching the police strike to historic images of mob rule, vicious
dictatorships, and anti-democratic ideals. An editorial featured in the September 11 issue
titled “Mob Rule in Boston” blamed the striking policemen for opening the door to
criminal activity to the utmost extreme, and even stated that the strike must be considered
a failure, though it was still underway, due to the high level violence and crime it had
provoked.241 A Washington Post headline on September 11 read, “Fatal Riot in Boston:
One man killed, woman shot and officer beaten by the mob,”242 and a headline in the Los
Angeles Times written on the same day declared, “City takes on war-like appearance”
and its attached article details a violent raid in Jamaica Plain, MA in which one person
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was shot and two more were wounded.243 As was typical for the press from this period,
journalists spread rumors through their provocative coverage in order to entice people
into purchasing newspapers. Koss highlights, “newspapers not only reflect the times but
also influence the reality of what they reflect.”244 While the print media was covering a
real upsurge in chaos throughout Boston, this type of exaggerated news media coverage
helped to increase tensions and sway opinion in favor of the Brahmins within the city by
over emphasizing the danger posed by a lack of police, police unionization, and labor in
general.
The New York Times, which claimed a much more national readership than many
other papers, also tracked the strike’s effect on Boston’s general public. With reporting
on the front page such as, “free from the restraining of the law, hundreds of young
gangsters and hoodlums in a few districts proceeded at once to break windows, loot
stores and cause disorder,” it soon became clear to the rest of the country that Boston was
becoming a hotbed of chaos and disorder.245 Headlines spoke of “Gamblers, thugs, and
thieves”246 and “miscellaneous ruffians” who had rushed to Boston to “share in the feast
of misrule.”247 Striking policemen left their usual neighborhood beats “defenseless
against crime and its variants, anarchy, and Bolshevism,”248 and the majority of the
remainder of Boston’s citizenry felt betrayed by their usual protectors. By using vivid
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terminology like hoodlums, ruffians, and anarchy, the media was able to create a binary
vision of society in which the policemen were solely responsible for keeping the peace
between the two sides, between the forces of order and chaos. Through journalism, the
unrest experienced in Boston was shown to be a direct result of the almost universal
absence of policemen from the city’s streets, showing a failure to adequately live up to
the expectations of the office and the city’s wealthy residents. Even when there was not
any concrete strike news, reporters were able to print “anxiety-provoking rumors”
surrounding the strike in order to increase tensions and heighten the emotional tone of the
strike itself, simultaneously increasing the importance of the strike on a national level.249
It took until the evening of the strike’s second day, Wednesday, September 10, for
the city to calm down from its state of utter pandemonium and hysteria. Boston’s
citizen’s had begun to take individual action to protect themselves and their property, and
more than 2,000 gun permit applications were submitted to the Boston Police Department
within a few hours of the walk-out.250 Whereas on September 9, only 123 people were
granted Revolver Licenses from the Department of the Police Commissioner, a record
1,082 licenses were granted on September 10.251 Eventually, Mayor Peters utilized his
power to take control of the police force, found in statutes from both 1885 and 1917, and
called out the members of the State Guard to help return the city to some semblance of
order. 252 The Boston Globe’s Evening Edition reported that over 4,000 state guardsmen
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were asked to report for police duty, yet this alone was not enough to return the city to a
state of normalcy.253
Once the patrolmen involved in the Boston Police Union walked out on strike, the
city looked to find adequate officers to create a legitimate, temporary police force. Since
many upper class Bostonians blamed the events of the strike on unchangeable
characteristics of the officers, using their ethnic origins and economic status as
confirmation of their un-American and anarchic tendencies, it was clear that any
replacement officers would need to be of a ‘better’ class and have a more ‘respectable’
background, again illustrating the domination of the upper class over their Irish
neighbors. Many white-collar corporations were willing to loan out their employees for
as long as the government needed. Of the 3,142 men assigned to special police duty,
1,954 came from administrative positions in corporations and business associations. The
railroad, for example, directly assigned 220 men to police duty while still paying them
their regular wages.254 By Thursday, September 11, the city was being patrolled by a
newly recruited temporary police force of approximately 7,000 men.255
From the start of September 1919 when rumors of strike began to be disseminated
throughout the city, newspapers read by Boston’s middle and upper classes began
running advertisements for volunteer policemen on their front pages. The notice in the
Boston Globe, first appearing on September 6 was looking to recruit, “able bodied men
willing to give their services in case of necessity…for protection of persons and
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property.”256 Even in these pre-strike advertisements, class played a crucial role; just as
many Bostonians had felt that the main duty of the pre-strike police force was to protect
the property of wealthy Brahmins and middle-class Bostonians, these same Bostonians
looked for members of their own community who would be loyal and protective of upper
and middle class interests as replacement, volunteer policemen. As explained by Sara
Stoutland, community members are more willing to place their trust in a police force if
they believe that the police share their priorities, act dependably, and will treat those they
are protecting with respect and admiration.257 In a society so concerned with wealth and
property, it was necessary for the new police force to be composed of people who would
similarly prioritize these two things. As a result of both the concern for the protection of
property as well as the aforementioned belief in the connection between ethnicity and
anarchic tendencies, the people recruited, and who voluntarily offered their services, for
the replacement police of Boston were mainly from the city’s upper classes.
A makeshift force of about 500 men was assembled hastily “as an emergency
measure for the protection of life and property,” yet this was not nearly enough to keep
the city under control.258 By the time Mayor Peters called out the state guard to help
suppress the strike, “he was already being assisted by a makeshift volunteer militia force
made up of prominent Back Bay Brahmins, old-time Beacon Hill residents, and about
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fifty Harvard underclassmen.”259 Many of these men were reported to be “fine specimens
of manhood,” offering Bostonians with a blatant method of classification for the
policemen who had been on strike; if the replacements were such fine specimens of
manhood, indeed the ideal police officer and the epitome of a true American man, then
the striking police officers were clearly none of those things.260 Understandings of
masculinity were connected to ideas of patriotism, especially in relation to the First
World War, the war effort, and the support of democracy; this can be seen in the
language and imagery of recruitment posters for the army.261 This type of classification
emphasized the division between the upper and the working class. The makeshift police
force, the upper class volunteers asserting their patriotism and loyalty through public
service in a time of need, was composed of real men, whereas the force of striking
policemen, members of the ethnic working class, was not, thus enhancing the difference
between the two classes with regard to personal character grounded in classist views of
society. The mere compilation of this new police force acts as evidence of the immense
role that economic class and ethnic division played in the chain of events leading to the
strike’s end.
The volunteer police force recruited as replacements for the striking policemen of
the Boston Police Union embodied everything that the strikers did not, namely native,
upper class origins and societal connections. Many Bostonians openly recognized that the
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fight against the strikers and the recruitment of replacement officers from upper class
institutions was a fight to maintain upper class power in Boston, and they were proud to
admit that their new officers were the type of people that were willing to protect upper
class interests. James S. Murphy at Stickney & Poor Spice Co. wrote in a letter to
Commissioner Curtis that the president of his company is “proud there are some
Americans left that will stand for the rights of what seems to be, at the present time, the
privileged class.”262 Even though police work, in contrast to police administration, was
not generally believed to be an acceptable profession for the more affluent members of
Boston’s society,263 exceptions were made in the case of the Boston Police Strike because
these men were not only working to protect the property and safety of their peers but also
the democracy and American nationalism that characterized the immediate post-war era.
Most replacement officers came from traditional positions of respect and
admiration, from recently discharged military officers to current and former Harvard
students.264 Harvard University was one of the places from which many of the volunteer
police were recruited, and the media immediately latched on to this as a way of
differentiating, and highlighting the differences between, the ethnic strikers and the
native, protestant Bostonians. This was especially easy, particularly because Harvard as
an institution had become a crucial focal point of class identity and an institution in
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which upper class values were acculturated to distinguish them from other Bostonians.265
Newspapers continuously featured profiles of prominent men, generally Harvard alumni
as well as current students, who had offered their services as volunteers to the
government. On September 8, 1919, the Boston Globe featured an articled titled, “Percy
Haughton to help protect city,” in which it described Haughton’s successful career as the
Harvard Football coach and the Director of the Braves Baseball Club. It then went on to
detail a meeting for prospective police recruits, specifically highlighting those in
attendance; “a number of other Harvard graduates, some of them ex-athletes, many of
them prominent and professional businessmen” were also looking to volunteer, it
stated.266 The main headline on the front page of the Globe’s evening edition on the
following day read, “Harvard organizing force for police duty in Boston,” and the article
emphasized that all 125 members of the football team were scheduled for police duty. It
included portraits of three “former Harvard athletes” also scheduled for work,
highlighting their achievements; the fact that the enlistment in the volunteer police of
Percy Haughton, Morril Wiggin, and Huntingdon R. Hardwick, prominent Harvard men
and Bostonians, was deemed important enough to be featured on the front page of the
paper alongside actual strike news, illustrated the emphasis Bostonians throughout the
strike put on class, ethnicity, and social connections.267 Where the working class had
failed the city, the upper class was willing and able to step in, further emphasizing the
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belief that the working class did not deserve to win the strike or change the way society
was organized because of their inability to keep order within the city without the help of
their upper class neighbors.
The success of journalistic attempts to sway public opinion in favor of Curtis and
the city’s economic elite268 is obvious in the abundance of letters written to Curtis by
members of Boston’s upper classes. Written mostly in response to Curtis’s suspension of
the 19 patrolmen who had been arrested, Boston businessmen and wealthy Brahmins
expressed their gratitude to Curtis for his stance on police unionization as well offered
suggestions and commendations on his work. As would be expected of the city’s upper
class residents, every letter expresses anger and resentment towards the striking
policemen, and many writers chose particularly strong language to express their feelings.
Some citizens warned Curtis of the consequences of a union victory, anticipating
the significance the strike would hold in the city’s history. “This struggle is of great
importance, not only to the city of Boston, but to the entire country, and I trust that you
will fight it through to a successful conclusion in order that we may have a reign of law
instead of a rule of class,” C.J. Morrison of Fairhaven, Massachusetts wrote.269 This is
particularly ironic, as the strike was ultimately a symbolic class struggle rather than an
issue of labor law. What Morrison really feared, though merely implied, was not rule by a
social class on principle but instead rule by a social class other than that to which he
belonged.
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Many Bostonians feared the strikers not because of their union alliances but
because of their un-American values and immoral characters, often associated with their
ethnic affiliations. J.W. Pickering, Counsellor [sic] at Law, wrote of the strikers, “They
have been false to their official oaths—worse than perjurers in Court—and have
deliberately and purposely plunged the city into the hands of the thugs and criminals with
whom they have thus allied themselves.”270 Using even stronger words, Felix B. Laman
at Walter D. Noyes, of the Eastern & Pacific Coast Lumber expressed a similar opinion
of the strikers, not attacking their policies or their actions, but rather their personal
character. Laman addressed Curtis more personally in his letter, asserting, “you are the
one man with guts enough to tell Sam Gompers and his whole gang of illiterate parasites
to return whence they came if they don’t care to respect the laws of this country. Give
‘em H-l. The better people rich and poor are behind you.”271 It is clear that both Pickering
and Laman believed that unionists are liars, anti-American, and anti-democratic. Laman
even went one step further, implying that the striking policemen were not among the
“better people” in the city and therefore belonged to an uncivilized class of men. To
many Bostonians, the strikers epitomized all that was un-American in the post-war era;
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this was particularly so in the wake of the 1919 Red Scare and Race Riots rooted in the
recent experience with war.272
Similarly, many Bostonians believed that the problem with unionization stemmed
not from the actual union’s existence but from its membership. George H. Lawley of
George Lawley & Son Corporation, Builders of Yachts and Motorboats, expressed this
opinion in his letter, stating that unions, “…cause us trouble on every hand…because
they are led by a lot of unprincipled men who do not earn their living and whose sole
object is to cause all the trouble they possible can.” In addition to the insinuation that the
origins of the union members led them to have few legitimate values when it came to
work and citizenship, Lawley believed that the members of the Boston Police Union were
ultimately troublemakers who cared little for the welfare of the community members they
protected, specifically middle and upper class Bostonians.273 At the root of many of the
condemnations of the strikers was an attack on their values and character, something
associated with upbringing, ethnicity and social class.
Some citizens went beyond the mere expression of gratitude, writing Curtis to
offer their resources and manpower to the state, should any aid be required. Robert S.
Hale, resident of Boylston Street in one of Boston’s upper class neighborhoods, was
ready to offer the service of his chauffer and his many cars to the police department,
though he was obviously unwilling to offer his personal service as a replacement officer.
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After expressing his approval of Curtis’s actions thus far, he wrote, “I took pleasure in
loaning my cars to Captain Rooney of Police Station #12, alternating with my chauffer in
driving for him until I left town…on business;274 he was willing to provide resources to
the Police Commissioner, yet he was too busy, engaged with ‘more important things,’ to
stay in Boston and see the strike through.
Some businesses, like Harding, Cox, & Martin, Real Estate Syndicate, were
willing to offer the use of their employees as volunteer policemen. In a letter signed by
the entire company, they recommended their associates to Curtis; “We have at our
disposal some very good, able bodied men, volunteers, draftees…who would make good
and efficient police officers for our district, the conduct of which throughout these trying
conditions commends itself to you,” the September 18, 1919 letter said.275 Another man
even went so far as to request that Curtis disregard the civil service requirements for
joining the Boston Police Force. Arguing that, “it seems that some leeway, in regard to
age, is due those who risked their lives to protect life and property during the unjust
strike,” Alexander MacLeod believed that his son, a minor who had acted as a volunteer
policeman during the strike, deserved to continue his duties as a policeman despite his
technical ineligibility due to age. 276 Many members of Boston’s upper classes were
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willing to do anything they could, including volunteering themselves, their family
members and their co-workers to help Curtis suppress the strike. People were willing to
support the anti-strike effort in unconventional ways, though they were merely asserting a
type of selfish generosity in that the suppression of the police strike would ultimately
maintain their position of power and supremacy in Boston society.
Many upper class Bostonians also expressed nationalist beliefs and a fear of
Bolshevism in their letters to Curtis, believing that a union victory would usher in an era
of revolution and Bolshevik rule. Many expressed this through dramatic predictions of a
Boston in which the union had won, writing, “If you allow your men to break their sworn
oath as to their allegiance to this Commonwealth and to this institution alone, what are
we coming to? Revolution, most certainly.”277 Others made more blatant accusations
directed at Bolshevik sympathizers. Patrick Fitzgerald seemed to believe that the
Bolsheviks were unquestionably behind the unionization of the Boston Police
Department as a method through which to undermine American democracy. In his letter
on August 18, weeks before the strike even began, he wrote:
Stand fast for our homes and the Right! The Am. Fed. Labor may know it or not,
but this police unionization is a part of the new move by the Bolsheviki of Russia
and Bocht Land. It is a part of their plan to weaken the protection of law and order
to the end that they may carry out here the program they put through in Petrograd,
Moscow, Berlin that is 1 – open the prisons, 2 – steal and kill, 3 – have no
punishment for anything whatever.278
277

F.D. Warren, letter to Police Commissioner Edwin Curtis, August 16, 1919 (included
in Boston Police Strike Documents of 1919, Special Collections, Boston Public Library,
accessed on July 30, 2010).
278
Patrick Fitzgerald, letter to Police Commissioner Edwin Curtis, August 18, 1919
(included in Boston Police Strike Documents of 1919, Special Collections, Boston Public
Library, accessed on July 30, 2010).

92

Though seemingly radical himself, Fitzgerald was not alone in his anti-Bolshevik
sentiments. Another man similarly wrote, “We have read enough of Bolsheviki, and
I.W.W., and Old-World turbulence; we do not desire to see our own fair democratic
republic seething with a like unrest and discord. Indeed, this ‘Federation’ may be the fruit
of foreign propaganda,” making the claim that the strike was undoubtedly orchestrated by
Bolshevik sympathizers overseas.279 Many saw the strike as evidence of Soviet
encroachment into the United States. Even later into the year 1919, it was clear through
what was printed in the Boston Labor World that many believed Bolshevism was in
opposition to all that American labor and the labor movement stood for. Hence, Curtis’s
strong anti-union actions were viewed as a symbol of American power and the triumph of
what Gary Gerstle refers to as the traditionalist dimension of Americanism. This
traditionalist Americanism focused on the mythic essence of America, based in family,
discipline, virtue and religious fundamentalism, and often relegated immigrant workers to
a subordinate place in American social life. Many upper class Bostonians identified with
this particular brand of nationalism, especially as it stood in opposition to more
progressive visions of America which gave the growing working class an increasing
power in everyday society.280
As a result, it is not surprising that this understanding of Americanism took center
stage in many of the letters Curtis received from members of the elite greater-Boston
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community throughout August and September 1919. One man connected his feelings of
Americanism to his New England heritage, stating:
Although the damage to me financially has been great and all the mental anxiety
considerable, I could not help feeling through it all that it was simply my part in a
new era in which a long period of more or less serious disregard of law and order
would be corrected and the old New England spirit of Americanism be established
more firmly now than ever.281
H. Leander D’Entremont of Salem, Massachusetts showed his support of the strike
through an assertion of his nationalist identity; not only did he offer congratulations to
Curtis from “A 100% American citizen,” he also composed and enclosed a new
American national anthem inside his letter.282 Another man, Willis B. Leonard of
Pittsfield, Massachusetts, expressed his hope that the new police force would be “at least
70% American,”283 and James Wilson Grimes, Counsellor [sic] at Law, advised Curtis to
“Discharge every one of the strikers and go back in the country towns and get some
husky Yankee boys to put in their places.” Grimes also reminded Curtis that, “Good
Americans and Yankees do not strike.”284 The Boston Post even printed an editorial
stating, “We are all American together. Let us act like Americans,” making it even more
clear that in the eyes of many, especially the general public of Boston, the police strike
281

Henry J. Bown, letter to Police Commissioner Edwin Curtis, September 26, 1919
(included in Boston Police Strike Documents of 1919, Special Collections, Boston Public
Library, accessed on July 30, 2010).
282
H. Leander D’Entremont, letter to Police Commissioner Edwin Curtis, September 18,
1919 (included in Boston Police Strike Documents of 1919, Special Collections, Boston
Public Library, accessed on July 30, 2010).
283
Willis B. Leonard, letter to Police Commissioner Edwin Curtis, September 14, 1919
(included in Boston Police Strike Documents of 1919, Special Collections, Boston Public
Library, accessed on July 30, 2010).
284
James Wilson Grimes, letter to Police Commissioner Edwin Curtis, September 11,
1919 (included in Boston Police Strike Documents of 1919, Special Collections, Boston
Public Library, accessed on July 30, 2010).

94
did not only symbolize the maintenance of the old social hierarchy but also was an
assertion of American supremacy and nationalist tendencies of post-war America.285
While many workers saw unionization in the post-war era as a way to maintain the gains
made during the First World War, members of the upper class more strongly opposed
collective action than ever before.286
Through the letters Curtis received, it is clear that upper class Bostonians not only
believed the Irish to be poor workers and unionists to be Bolshevik sympathizers, despite
the fact that less than .001% of the adult American public officially belonged to one of
the two communist parties,287 but also believed that the combination of ethnicity and
social class ultimately led these men to be anti-American and completely disloyal to their
adopted, Brahmin dominated community. Especially as the Boston Police Strike occurred
only a few weeks after a textile strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts where many believed
that the Catholics involved in the strike, mostly recently arrived immigrants, were
unquestionably communist, it comes as no surprise that Anglo-Protestant members of the
Greater Boston community saw connections between Soviet sympathies and unionization
in general.288 The summer of 1919 in general saw an unprecedented amount of antiSoviet actions, including the notorious Palmer Raids. The Boston Post recognized that
Boston was not Moscow, yet it still printed a statement reading, “No Soviet mob rule for
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us, thank you.”289 It did not matter that the rumors of Soviet relations and communist
undertones of the strike were false, because the media as well as influential members of
the Boston community perpetuated these connections as a method of proving that the
socioeconomic class and ethnic origins of the striking policemen were undoubtedly at the
root of their anti-American tendencies. Despite the fact that the anti-communist hysteria
running rampant through American society was exaggerated to the extent that it began to
stereotype all members of the working class, unionist and not, as communist, many
members of the upper class fell victim to the exaggerated rumors and acted as if all
rumors of Bolshevik sympathies were unquestionably true.
Despite the general disapproval of most upper class members of Boston society
and the widespread belief that police workers were different that the average wage
worker, some members of the working class did support the strike and undertook
sympathetic actions. The President of the Boston Central Labor Union issued a statement
commending the policemen for “their courage in asserting their rights to protect and the
promote the interests of themselves and their families through the application of the
principles of collective bargaining.”290 The Boston Labor World printed continuous
commendations of the strikers’ actions, including accusations that Bostonians were too
quick to demand the dismissal of the strikers and that the Boston Police Department had
turned into an autocratic regime, reminding Bostonians that the striking policemen had
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not only been subjected to an unfair wage but also to unjust humiliation and preferential
treatment.291
Some actions that were seen as sympathetic may have in fact been a direct attack
on upper class control over the city’s culture and society by members of the working
class. People who had volunteered to act as replacement officers were often met by
threats of violence. Many tailors refused to make uniforms for the new patrolmen,
especially significant because of the importance that uniforms had played in the
transformation of the Boston Police Department into a thoroughly modern police force.
Regardless of whether or not other working class Bostonians agreed with the actions of
the strikers, it was obvious that they were against the aggressive, controlling policies of
the city’s wealthy elite.
The city countered these efforts by granting recruited police a $300 rise in salary
from what patrolmen had been making previously, gave them their first uniform for free,
and created a pension system.292 Ironically, the volunteer police received everything that
the striking patrolmen had been demanding, revealing that the strike was only
superficially about material gains and the betterment of working conditions. In fact, the
strike was a symbolic struggle of the ethnic working class to restructure the social
hierarchy, challenging Boston’s traditional class divisions and elitist social constructions.
The improvements to police work made upon the replacement of the striking officers, the
progressive gains that working class Americans across all industries had been fighting to
procure for the past century, were not the ultimate goal of the Boston Police Strike.
291
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Instead, these material concerns were merely a vehicle through which the policemen
could address their real grievances, those related to class hierarchy and societal
organization. Ultimately, the policemen failed in their attempt to alter the organization of
Boston society.
According to historian Frederick Koss, it was the citizenry of Boston, through the
support of Americans nationwide, who had written the ending to the police struggle.293
Through their condemnation of the striker’s actions and their unconditional support of
their fellow Brahmins, like Commissioner Curtis and Governor Coolidge, they were able
to end the wave of police unionization and silence public workers for decades to come. In
fact, none of the striking policemen ever worked for the Boston Police Force after their
walkout.294 John McInnes, famed leader of the Boston Police Union, is listed as a
bricklayer in the 1920 Federal Census of Population.295 Other strikers found themselves
in similar situations. Edmund Burke is recorded as being a clerk for the railroad, James
G. Peters became an automobile salesman, and Hugh F. Garrity is listed as a watchman in
the Navy Yard.296 The suppression of the Boston Police Strike provoked the destruction
of all 37 other police locals affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, and their
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final defeat, symbolic of their failed struggle to be seen as workers and employees rather
than puppets of the state, was their failure to win reinstatement after the end of the strike,
made official when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the dismissal of the
strikers on November 7, 1919.297
Rather than create a new understanding of the role and position of police officers
within the Boston social hierarchy, the police strike left officers in “a paternalistic
limbo,” one in which they would not be able to overcome until over half a century
later.298 Even then, legislation often prohibited policemen from striking in order to
“maintain law enforcement services without disruption.”299 Burton and Krider see this
type of legislation as essential, because strikes in essential municipal services would
immediately endanger the community’s health and safety, and therefore should be
presumed illegal.300 The Boston Police Strike effectively failed to establish a role for
individual policemen, leaving them in the exact same position as that in which they had
started the strike.301 In the end, the Brahmin elite of Boston were able to maintain their
status, traditionally at the top of the socioeconomic and intellectual ladder, through the
suppression of police unionization within the city.
According to White, the Boston Police Strike was one of the “ending dramas” of
the Progressive Era, signaling a shift into a new decade and a new era of American
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history.302 Another wave of police reform during which an attempt at administrative
transformation, mirroring the previous attempts at reform during the 1890s, was
inaugurated during the inter-war period, and the beginning of this drive to yet again
reform urban police can be traced back to the end of the Boston Police Strike. The Boston
Police Strike of 1919, unique from other working class efforts aimed at material gains
and superficial improvements in working conditions, was a failed attempt by the ethnic
working class to gain control of the social system in a major industrial city. It provoked a
wave of reform during which the middle and upper classes attempted to take back control
of municipal governments and departments from the very hands of the ethnic working
class, putting it back in the hands of those traditionally in charge.303
The editorial printed in the Boston Sunday Post on September 14, 1919 is
representative of the impact the strike had on the city and the nation at large. It read:
It has been a strenuous week for Boston – a chapter in her history never to be
forgotten. Boston is not proud of the record; in some respects it is very
black.…But the darkest days have passed…perhaps it is well that the issue has
been fought out, rather than that the menace should continue to hang over the city.
It will be a long time before there will occur another strike of the Boston
Policemen. The lesson has been learned in the hard school of experience. It is a
severe lesson and it will be long remembered… Thus, law and order win out in
our good old city, and it will be many a day before it is threatened in like manner.
Boston is Herself again.304
Once order had been restored, Boston’s social organization and class structure appeared
to have been affected little by the strike. When Post symbolically claimed that Boston
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was “herself again,” it showed that Boston had returned to its pre-strike state, rather than
evolved into a new Boston. By returning the city to a state of normalcy, Boston’s upper,
and controlling, classes had effectively affirmed the already established social structure
and eliminated any hope of a city run by a powerful majority, the ethnic working class.
Leonard S. Smith of Shelburne Falls, MA wrote of the Boston Police Strike, “It is
simply a case of whether we shall live under a law for the majority or bow to a small
minority.”305 Though he meant for the striking policemen to be associated with the “small
minority” in his statement, it is ultimately to another small minority that the city bowed:
the wealthy upper class. In the end, the strike marked the conclusion of an era of social
struggle between the upper and working classes, ushering in an era of conformity, social
repression, and intense American nationalism dictated by upper class, rather than
working class, Bostonians.
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Conclusion
Calvin Coolidge famously responded to the Boston Police Strike by stating,
“There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime,”
echoing the sentiments of most members of Boston’s upper classes with regard to the
events of September 1919.306 This statement makes apparent the success of the Brahmins
in suppressing the efforts of the city’s Irish working class, which attempted to reorganize
Boston society and redefine their community’s place within it through a walkout in a
distinctively essential public industry. Members of the working class, a majority of
Boston’s population by the early twentieth century, learned the lesson that acting in
opposition to the beliefs and visions of the wealthy Brahmin class would get them
nowhere in their fight for fairness and equality. They would be unable to make any
headway in their quest for economic, social, and ethnic justice, if they questioned the
authority of the Brahmins in traditional Boston life.
The events of the Boston Police Strike of 1919 concluded at the end of that
infamous year, when the last members of the Massachusetts State Militia were withdrawn
from Boston on December 21.307 Though the strike unified much of the Boston Irish
working class and solidified their presence as an influential force on the city’s social
scene, the elite Brahmins ultimately came out on top, publicly pronouncing and strongly
upholding their status and power over their working class neighbors. The doomed history
of the Boston Police Union’s creation, affiliation with the American Federation of Labor,
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and failed strike of September 1919 only emphasized the success of the Brahmins in
maintaining control and power over the populous, ethnic working class majority.
Bostonians has never forgotten this defining event in their city’s history, and given the
persistence of ethnic and class struggle within the city through to the present day, it
surely never will.
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